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REGULATORY TAKINGS: A CONTRACT
APPROACH
Ross B. Lipsker* & Rebecca L. Heldt**
Professor Martinez, the author of the preceding Article, states:
Traditional analyses of the takings problem seek an accommo-
dation between private property rights and governmental power.
This Article proposes instead that the takings problem be analyzed
as the search for the proper demarcation between private and
public "bundles of rights" with respect to property. The doctrinal
framework for this separation is a concept that the relationship
between private and public rights "in" property is an "implied
contract" between government and individual. The Article pro-
poses an analytical approach that asks what expectations a property
owner has and when those expectations were formed. In my
Article, I suggest that a sharp division between property and
governmental regulation of it is unjustifiable and leads to a takings
jurisprudence that is unworkable. I suggest a unitary analysis
which focuses instead on the purposes that property serves.
I. Introduction
In every modern society, land and its use rank among the gov-
ernment's most important concerns.' If a society were measured
* Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, Western State University, College of
Law, San Diego, California; former Vice President of Judicate, Inc., and of counsel
to law firms in California and Pennsylvania; admitted to practice in California
and Pennsylvania; B.A. and J.D., Temple University. I wish to express my gratitude
to Professor William Slomanson for his advice, technical assistance and help in
maintaining a sense of humor. I also want to thank Ms. Leslie Kammerer for her
many hours of assistance on this Article.
** Associate corporate counsel, The Hahn Company, San Diego, California;
admitted to practice in California; Instructor, Western State University, College of
Law, San Diego, California; B.S., University of Kansas; J.D., Western State
University. I wish to express my appreciation to Michael C. Spata, attorney at law
and Adjunct Professor, for igniting my interest in land use law, and for his support
and encouragement throughout the production of this Article.
1. See generally MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1975); 1
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 1.02 - 1.11 (3d ed. 1986); D. HAGMAN,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW §§ 28-32 (1971); 8 E.
MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25.01 - 25.46 (3d ed. 1983);
5 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 745-747 (1986); 1 P.
ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §§ 1.02 - 10.04 (1987).
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exclusively by the skill with which this concern had been handled,
the United States would be less than a success. In fact, until only
last year, the Supreme Court had avoided making substantive de-
cisions in the area of land use regulation since 1981.2 The Court's
1987 decisions3 thus ended an era in which the most influential
opinidn was, in large part, a dissenting opinion written by Justice
Brennan in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego.4
Aithough the actual impact of the Court's most receni decisions
on the future of land use regulation remains unknown, it is certain
to be extensive-and expensive. Specifically, the decisions fail to
give either land owners or municipalities clear-cut guidance in an-
swering the frequently litigated question: when does land use reg-
ulation go too far and become a taking under the fifth amendment?5
This Article'begins, in Part II,'by defining the parameters of the
fifth amendment's taking clause. Part III then reviews the various
tests used in determining whether governmental action constitutes a
taking. Part IV places the recent Supreme Court decisions within
the framework of case law as it has evolved since the Court's 1922
landmark decision, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.6 Finally, the
Article suggests a formula based on well-established contract prin-
ciples for analyzing the impact of land use regulation on private
property interests.
II. The Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause: Defining the
Parameters
This Article focuses on the relationship between land use regulation
and the taking clause of the fifth amendment, which provides that
2. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). The Court
dismissed the appeal for lack of a final state court judgment. Id.; see also MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
3. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
4. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Brennan disputed the majority's holding that no final state courtjudgment had been reached and addressed the merits of the case. He found that
a property owner should receive compensation for the period of time during which
a confiscatory regulation denies all beneficial use of the property, even if the
regulation is later withdrawn or amended. A majority of the Court adopted this
view in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.
Ct. at 2388. See infra notes 185-98 for a discussion of First English.
5. See infra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fifth amend-
ment's taking clause.
6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
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private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just
compensation."' As the Supreme Court observed in United States
v. General Motors Corp.,8 the critical terms are "property," 9
"taken,"o and "just compensation.""
What is meant by the word "property"? 2 In a case involving the
effect of New York's Landmark Preservation Law on the ability of
the owner of Penn Central Terminal to construct a fifty-five-story
office tower above the terminal, Justice Rehnquist conceded that it
is conceivable that the word property was "not used in the 'vulgar
and uritechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which
the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.' " Rather, the word
denoted " 'the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1944).
9. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the just compensation issue, which exceeds the scope
of this Article, see Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction
Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for
Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. .685 (1986); Costonis, Pre-
sumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 465 (1983); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967);
Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search
for a Solution Continues, 18 URB. LAW. 635 (1986); Williams, Smith, Siemon,
Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193
(1984).
12. Black's Law Dictionary defines property in the following manner:
Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which
belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights
which are guaranteed and protected by the government. The term is said
to extend to every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically,
ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to
dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to
exclude every one else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite
right of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular
things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and dis-
posing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to anything; being
used to refer to that right which one has to lands or tenements, goods
or chattels, which no way depends on another man's courtesy.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted). Compare this
legal definition with the following:
Property-2a: something that is or may be owned or possessed ... b:
the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing: a valuable
right or interest primarily a source or element of wealth . . . c: something
to which a person has a legal title: an estate in tangible assets (as lands,
goods, money) or intangible rights (as copyrights, patents) in which or
to which a person has a right protected by law.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1818 (1971).
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the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.' '"-3
Thus, the word property means more than a physical object or
piece of land. Ownership of property is often described as a bi ndle
of rights with each of the elements of ownership a strand or :alk
within the bundle. 4 The lay person, however, may not thir in
terms of a bundle of rights, but instead may perceive proper ' in
the manner that one commentator has suggested:
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached
To the world: Keep off unless you have my permission, whicl
I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private Citizen. Endorsed: Th
State. I-
These words imply a very complex relationship between the indiv lual
and the state concerning the ownership of property. Withit the
context of this complex relationship, the private citizen and the :ate
establish their respective rights. In fact, there are actually two bu les
of rights-one inhering in the individual and one in the state. Fhe
individual's bundle holds three basic stalks: (1) the right to ph: ical
possession, including the right to exclude others;16 (2) the rig to
alienate the property; 7 and (3) the right to use the property a the
owner sees fit.'"
Similarly, the state has a parallel three-stalk bundle: (1) the .ght
to take property for public use;'9 (2) the right to tax and re jire
fees;20 and (3) the right to regulate or limit the use of proper ' to
prevent a harm to, or promote a benefit to, society. 2' The deli tely
balanced relationship between these two interrelated bundles of r: hts,
13. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp 323
U.S. 373, 377-78 (1944)) (emphasis added); see infra notes 119-26 and accomp, ying
text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043, 1052 (1lth Cir. 984)
(bundle of rights); Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917, 930 (2d Cir. 947)
(bundle of rights or other legal relations); People v. Walker, 33 Cal. App. 18,
20, 90 P.2d 854, 855 (1939) (complex bundle of rights, duties, powers at im-
munities); Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 451, 2: %4.E.
2d 993, 998 (1938) (bundle of privileges); Barclay White Co. v. Unemplc nent
Compensation Bd. of Review, 159 Pa. Super. 94, 99, 46 A.2d 598, 602 946)
(bundle of rights).
15. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357. 374 1 )54).
16. See infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 69-144 and accompanying text.
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which has developed simultaneously though not always at the same
pace, has been described as an implied contract.22
A. The Right to Physical Possession
The relationship between the citizen and the state is most easily
perceived in the interaction between the first stalks in each of the
bundles. The individual's first stalk, the right to physical possession,
may include both permanent and temporary possession, the right to
exclude others, and freedom from physical invasion. The state's first
stalk is the right to take private property for public use.
1. Freedom From Permanent and Temporary Takings
When the state takes permanent physical possession of property
for public use it must simultaneously recognize the individual's right
to just compensation. Assuming that the state is legitimately exer-
cising its police power, the "implied contract" requires that the
individual relinquish his rights in favor of the state. At the same
time, the contract requires the state to pay for this surrender.
This concept of exclusive physical possession has a long history
in United States case law. In the earliest cases, the state took a
portion of an individual's property for such classic purposes as
constructing roads, railroads, and military installations.23 More re-
22. Implied contract has been defined in the following manner:
A contract inferred from the conduct of the parties, although not expressed
in words. Implied in fact:-a real contract but one inferred from the
circumstances, the conduct, acts, or relation of the parties, rather than
from their spoken words.
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted).
The law is rich with circumstances and relationships that imply an agreement.
For example, a contract to marry can be deduced from the relationship and conduct
of the parties even absent express promissory words. See Homan v. Earle, 53 N.Y.
267 (1873). As between a public utility and its consumers, a contract to furnish
a particular amount of its product will be implied without an express agreement.
See Humphreys v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 190 Ky. 733, 229 S.W. 117
(1921). When no express contract exists, the rendering of services by an attorney
to a client who accepts such benefits will create an implied contract. See Royal
Crown Bottling Co. v. Chandler, 226 S.C. 94, 83 S.E.2d 745 (1954).
23. See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1922) (highways);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (railroads); Secombe v.
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 108 (1874) (railroads); Olcott v.
Fond du Lac County, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872) (railroads); Mills v. St. Clair
County, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 569 (1850) (roads and ferry landings); Iriarte v. United
States, 157 F.2d 105 (1st Cir. 1946) (military installation); City of Oakland v.
United States, 124 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1942) (military installation), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 679 (1942); United States v. Certain Lands, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935) (public
buildings), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 726 (1936); In re Military Training Camp, 260
F. 986 (E.D. Va. 1919) (military installation).
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cently, the state has taken large tracts of land to create or protect
public parks, forests and national monuments. 4 In Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,5 the physical possession at
issue constituted merely a few inches on the roof and a few inches
along the side of a building. 26 Nonetheless, the Court held that
under the fifth amendment, this de minimis physical possession
constituted a taking and required just compensation. 27 Thus, it is
well established that whether permanent physical possession consists
of an entire parcel, a significant part of it, or a slender six-inch
box and one-half-inch cable, under the circumstances, the state
violates the individual's right to possession and must fulfill its duty
to pay just compensation.
Moreover, an occasional or temporary taking by the state also
entitles the individual to just compensation. For example, in time
24. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546 (1946) (national park); Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1928)
(historical site); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (historical
site); Barnidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939) (historical site);
Coggeshall v. United States, 95 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1938) (national forest); United
States v. 546.03 Acres, More or Less, of Land Situated in Union Tp., 22 F. Supp.
775 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (national park).
25. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The case involved a New York law requiring landlords
to permit cable television installations on their property for the benefit of their
tenants, but limiting the landlords' compensation to a one-time, $1 payment. The
Court made the following statements:
Few would disagree that if the State required landlords to permit third
parties to install swimming pools on the landlords' rooftops for the
convenience of the tenants, the requirement would be a taking. If the
cable installation here occupied as much space, again, few would disagree
that the occupation would be a taking. But constitutional protection for
the rights of private property cannot be made to depend on the size of
the area permanently occupied.
Id. at 436-37. "[Wlhether the installation is a taking," the Court continued, "does
not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox."
Id. at 438 n.16.
The Court narrowed the application of this holding in F.C.C. v. Florida Power
Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987), finding that the utility company's rights had not
been taken by a federal regulation limiting the amount the company could charge
CATV companies, under contracts the utilities chose to enter, for use of the utility
company's poles. The Court distinguished Loretto from Florida Power:
[W]hile the statute we considered in Loretto specifically required landlords
to permit permanent occupation of their property by cable companies,
nothing in the Pole Attachments Act ... gives cable companies any
right to occupy space on utility poles, or prohibits utility companies from
refusing to enter into attachment agreements with cable operators.
Id. at 1112.
26. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422.
27. Id. at 436-37.
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of war the state's need becomes superior to that of the individual;
the state then acts within its authority to take property to further
the war effort.28 Nonetheless, the contractual relationship does not
cease to exist: such action entitles the individual to just compensation.
Thus, in United States v. General Motors Corp.,29 the federal gov-
ernment took space within a warehouse for a period of just over
one year. The Supreme Court found that the government had the
right to take the space for public use and that the individual had
the right to compensation for the interference with his possession. °
The Court noted:
The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner
rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign
constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of acquisition
of title or [permanent] occupancy has been held, if its effects are
so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest
in the subject matter, to amount to a taking.3 1
2. The Right to Exclude
When governmental action restricts the right to exclude others but
technically leaves the owner in possession, the parties' rights and
duties are not always clear. For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States,32 the government was denied the right to force a marina
owner to allow access to the public without compensation. After
obtaining the necessary Army Corps of Engineers permits, the owner
dredged a shallow lagoon to create a private marina surrounded by
a housing community. 3 The government claimed that the lagoon
was included within the navigable waters of the United States and
thus the owners could not lawfully exclude the public.34 The Supreme
Court agreed that the marina fell within navigable waters and there-
fore was subject to a navigational servitude. 5 But the Court had
28. See Annotations, Compensation for Property Confiscated or Requisitioned
During War, 149 A.L.R. 1451 (1944), 148 A.L.R. 1384 (1944), 147 A.L.R. 1295
(1943) and 137 A.L.R. 1290 (1942).
29. 323 U.S. 373 (1944).
30. General Motors primarily involved the issue of what constitutes just com-
pensation-more particularly, future loss of profits, moving expenses, loss of good
will, cost of removing fixtures or consequential damages, etc.
31. General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378.
32. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
33. Id. at 167.
34. Id. at 170.
35. Id. at 171. The government imposed a navigational servitude when "the
public acquired a right of access to what was once petitioner's private pond." Id.
at 166.
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never specifically held that a navigational servitude created a blanket
exception to the taking clause that subjected the land to a public
right of access.36 The Court thus rejected the government's contention
that by investing "substantial amounts of money in making im-
provements [in] what was once a private pond . . . the owner ha[d]
somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude
others.'" 3
The Court concluded that the government must pay just com-
pensation if it wished to take the servitude for the public's benefit:
[T]he "right to exclude," so universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right, falls within [the] category of interests
that the [g]overnment cannot take without compensation....
[T]he imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will
result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.?
This fundamental element of the property right, the right to exclude,
however, may finish a poor second when such exclusion is found
to infringe on what courts consider a more fundamental right. For
example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,39 the right to
exclude fell victim to a higher fundamental right-the right to free
speech. Based on state constitutional provisions, 40 the California
Supreme Court upheld the solicitation of signatures for a political
petition at a privately-owned shopping center. In affirming the de-
cision, the Supreme Court pointed out that the center owner "may
restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner
regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial
functions. ' 4 1 The Court concluded that the center had "failed to
demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the
use or economic value of [its] property that the state-authorized
limitation of it amounted to a 'taking.' "142
In other cases, the interference with the right to possession and
the right to exclude others arose incidentally from regulations aimed
at a different purpose. In Hall v. City of Santa Barbara,43 the Ninth
36. Id. at 172-73.
37. Id. at 176.
38. Id. at 179-80.
39. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
40. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860, aff'd,
447 U.S. 74, 79 (1979) (citing CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3).
41. 447 U.S. at 83.
42. Id. at 84.
43. 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Circuit found that a city ordinance designed to control rents on
mobile home parking spaces resulted in a transfer of a possessory
estate to the park tenants. 44 The court concluded that the ordinance-
which gave tenants an indefinite, transferable lease-in effect left
landlords "with the right to collect reduced rents while tenants [had]
practically all other rights in the property . . . [which] oversteps the
boundaries of mere regulation and shades into permanent occupation
of the property for which compensation is due." '45
Justice Rehnquist made a similar argument in dissent in Fresh
Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan,' 6 which also involved a
rent control ordinance.4 7 The Chief Justice found that the combi-
nation of the ordinance's anti-eviction and anti-demolition provisions
"deprive[d] [the owner] of the use of its property in a manner
closely analogous to a permanent physical invasion." ' 4 Justice Rehn-
quist observed that the "power to exclude is 'one of the most
treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights [because]
even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to . . . the
occupied space, ... the permanent occupation of that space by a
stranger would ordinarily empty the right of any value . . . . ",,
Thus, he concluded, the ordinance resulted in a compensable taking
of property.
In a dissenting opinion in Nash v. City of Santa Monica,50 Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court Justice Mosk addressed an ordinance similar
to the one in Fresh Pond Shopping Center.' Mosk pointed out that
the majority in Nash relied on Fresh Pond Shopping Center, "a
case that has produced no prevailing written opinion at any level,"5"
only Rehnquist's dissent. But in finding that the ordinance only
44. Id. at 204. Tenants could transfer their lease to a new tenant without the
owner's permission when they sold their mobile homes. The owner could terminate
the leases only for cause, and had no say in the tenants' selection of buyers for
their homes. Id.
45. Id. at 206-07.
46. 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
48. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, 464 U.S. at 877 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 878 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982)).
50. 37 Cal. 3d 97, 111, 688 P.2d 894, 904, 207 Cal. Rptr. 285, 295 (1984)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 112, 688 P.2d at 905, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
He found: "If the city forces this owner to involuntarily transfer his property to
a third person, the result is no less a taking than if the municipality itself were
to assume title to the property." Id.
52. Id. at 112, 688 P.2d at 905, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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imposed an "indirect and minimal burden" on Nash, the majority
"ignore [Rehnquist's] conclusion: i.e., that the rent control ordinance
is the equivalent of 'a physical occupation of the appellant's property,'
which ... constitutes a taking without just compensation." 53
3. Freedom From Physical Invasion
The government action may sometimes constitute an invasion of
property rather than a physical possession; thus, the Court must
first determine the extent of the owner's right to possession before
deciding whether the government has interfered with that right. The
Latlin, Est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, expresses the ancient
common law principle that land extends to the edge of the universe.14
This doctrine did not anticipate modern air transportation. None-
theless, flights over land may in certain instances constitute a tem-
porary and occasional interference with physical possession that
entitles the individual to just compensation.
For example, United States v. Causby" presented an interesting
problem of physical invasion rather than physical possession. Caus-
by's chicken farm was located directly under the flight path of an
airport runway. When the chickens began dying of fright from
aircraft noise, plaintiffs brought suit." Writing for the majority,
Justice Douglas observed that "airspace is a public highway." He
reasoned, however, that it is obvious that "if the landowner is to
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of
the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. 5 7 The Court
affirmed Causby in another overflight case, Griggs v. Allegheny
County,"8 emphasizing that "the use of land presupposes the use of
some of the airspace above it ... otherwise no home could be
built, no tree planted, no fence constructed, no chimney erected." 59
The Court has thus recognized the right of freedom from an
invasion of possession. While the Court's language has often focused
on an interference with the individual's right-of-use stalk, a stalk
in which the relationship between the state and the individual is
53. Id. at 113, 688 P.2d at 905, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
54. E. COKE, INSTITUTES (19th ed. 1832); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
(Lewis ed. 1902).
55. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
56. The runway was used 4076 of the time for take-offs and 77o of the time
for landings. See id. at 259.
57. Id. at 264.
58. 369 U.S. 84, reh'g denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962).
59. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
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quite complex, the decisions rest equally upon the individual's right-
of-possession (including the right to exclude) stalk. In short, the
well-established relationship between the state's right to take the
property and the individual's right to receive just compensation for
a physical possession of the property includes a physical invasion
of the property.
In sum, courts have clearly delineated the contractual relationship
between the individual and the government with respect to the right
to possession, which includes: (1) both permanent and temporary
possession; (2) the right to exclude others; and (3) freedom from
physical invasion.
B. The Right to Alienate
The right to alienate property is another clearly discernable stalk
in the owner's bundle of rights. Surely, ownership of property
includes the right to sell or give that property to another. The
government has its parallel stalk-the right to require fees and taxes
for such transactions. But, when the government's regulations go
beyond the collection of reasonable fees or limited restrictions on
sale and actually preclude the sale or transfer of the property to
anyone but the government, such regulation constitutes a compen-
sable taking.
For example, a federal regulation that required escheat, or reversion
to the tribe, by the individual of certain interests in Indian land
was declared unconstitutional in Hodel v. Irving.60 The purpose of
the regulation was to prevent further fractionation of interests and
allow for consolidation and more profitable uses of the land. 6'
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated:
[T]he regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the
right to pass on a certain type of property-the small undivided
interest-to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass
on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times .... Even the
United States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass
property is unprecedented and likely unconstitutional. 62
60. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
61. Id. at 2081; see Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, tit.
II, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983).
62. Irving, 107 S. Ct. at 2083-84 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor continued:
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a
particular class of property may be a taking, we reaffirm the continuing
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In Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex63 and Rippley v. City of
Lincoln,64 land use regulations restricted the plaintiffs' property to
use for governmental purposes such as creating schools, parks or
governmental facilities. In addition to denying the owners any rea-
sonable use of the property, the restrictions denied them the right
to sell the property to anyone but the governmental agency that
enacted the restrictions. This loss of the right to alienate the property
thus destroyed that stalk in the owner's bundle of property rights
and resulted in a compensable taking.
In Sheerr v. Evesham Township,65 a regulation restricted property
to an environmental protection zone where private development was
not allowed. Again, the plaintiff had lost the right to alienate the
property because there would be no viable market for the land.
Similarly, in Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale,66 property was placed
in a conservation zone that precluded development. As the Arizona
Supreme Court noted: "As long as the property was 'zoned' in the
[c]onservation [a]rea, there was no reasonable hope that anyone would
purchase the property .... ,,67 Loss of the right of alienation was
also a factor considered by the California courts in San Diego Gas
& Elec. v. San Diego,68 since the rezoning of 141 of the utility's
acres to open space not only made them unusable for the utility's
purposes, but also unmarketable.
Interference with this stalk in the property owner's bundle of rights
often arises from a land use restriction-rarely from a specific
vitality of the long line of cases recognizing the States', and where
appropriate, the United States', broad authority to adjust the rules gov-
erning the descent and devise of property without implicating the guar-
antees of the [j]ust [c]ompensation [cilause. The difference in this case
is the fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished; indeed,
they are abolished even in circumstances when the governmental purpose
sought to be advanced, consolidation of ownership of Indian lands, does
not conflict with the further descent of the property. . . .Accordingly,
we find that this regulation in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes too
far."
Id.
63. 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961). See infra notes 131-32
and accompanying text.
64. 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983). See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying
text.
65. 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (L. Div. 1982). See infra notes 133-35
and accompanying text.
66. 149 Ariz. 538, 720 P.2d 513 (1986).
67. Id. at 544 n.3, 720 P.2d at 519 n.3.
68. 450 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1981). The state court's opinion is at 81 Cal. App.
3d 844, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1978).
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prohibition on alienation as in Irving. Nonetheless, a compensable
taking will result if the owner loses the right to sell or transfer the
property, whether it is a complete restriction or merely a restriction
of sale only to a governmental agency.
C. Freedom of Use
Freedom of use, the most complex stalk in the bundle of owner's
rights, presents a difficult problem in establishing the individual/
governmental relationship. Much of the complexity results from the
interrelationship between the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, 69 the tenth amendment's police power,70 and the fifth amend-
ment's taking clause. 71 Courts are not always clear as to which
provision they are addressing.
This confusion is unnecessary. There should be no constitutional
conflict between the government's right to regulate health, safety
and welfare pursuant to the police power embodied in the tenth
amendment, and the individual's right to be compensated under the
fifth amendment for the taking of property. Citing Justice Holmes,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed that "the protection of private
property in the [f]ifth [a]mendment presupposes that it is wanted
for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use
without compensation. 7 2 Provided the regulation actually falls within
the constitutional limits of the police power, 73 analysis can focus on
whether the regulation constitutes a taking.
The problem of interference with the freedom to use property has
created much more difficulty for the courts than the problem of
interference with possession or alienation. If the interference with
use is total, it can be equated with physical possession and result
in a compensable taking. However, short of a complete interference,
what will constitute a compensable taking? It is this problem that
has been the focus of much of the courts' attention. As the next
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the amendment provides: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of ... property, without due process of
law ....-
70. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
72. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1255
(1987) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
73. This Article presumes that the regulation falls within constitutional limitations
unless otherwise noted.
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part of this Article will illustrate, this attention has resulted in a
variety of tests which, rather than solving the problem, has added
to the confusion.
III. A Potpourri of Tests: Sixty-Five Years of Confusion
A. The Nuisance Theory
Many early land-use regulation cases indicated that any regulation
enacted to prevent a harm did not result in a compensable taking.
The foundation for this theory was the concept of nuisance. Through-
out history, both society and individuals have been able to prevent
property owners from unduly burdening others with activities on
their land. When a property owner has created a harm, the gov-
ernment's role is to prevent that harm so that adjoining property
owners, or-in'the case of a public nuisance-society, do not suffer
this nuisance. In effect, through regulations, the government directs
this burden away from other property owners back to the originator.
In an early case, Mugler v. Kansas,14 a state law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of liquor except for certain medicinal purposes
was upheld. The statute at issue declared all places where liquor
was made, stored or sold to be common nuisances subject to abate-
ment. The state sought to shut down a brewery as a common
nuisance; the owners contended that the buildings were specially
designed only for use as a brewery and asserted that the nuisance
abatement provision of the statute was unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment."
74. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
75. The owners asserted that the fourteenth amendment reserved certain rights
to the citizen with which the state cannot interfere without violating the due process
clause. The owners made the following argument:
[T]he [sitate may control the tastes, appetites, habits, dress, food, and
drink of the people; our system of government, based upon the indi-
viduality and intelligence of the citizen, does not claim to control him,
except as to his conduct to others, leaving him the sole judge as to all
that only affects himself.
Id. at 660. They then asserted that the right to manufacture liquor for their own
use or for sale outside the state was one of those interests of which they should
be the sole judges. Id. The Court was querulous:
[Bly whom, or by what authority, is it to be determined whether the
manufacture of particular articles of drink, either for general use or for
the personal use of the maker, will injuriously affect the public? Power
to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere;
else society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their
own appetites and passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and




The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to grant the
state the requested nuisance abatement relief. 76 The Court found that
prohibiting the sale of liquor was within the state's police power to
protect the public health, safety and welfare, but that the power
was limited by provisions of the Constitution. 7
Another early case decided on a nuisance theory was Hadacheck
v. Sebastian,8 in which the plaintiff operated a quarry and brick-
yard on the outskirts of Los Angeles. Eventually, as the property
was gradually surrounded by a burgeoning residential community,
the City of Los Angeles decided that the brickyard was a nuisance.
To prevent public harm to the surrounding residential communities,
the state court prohibited the use of the property as a brick smelter.
Hadacheck then claimed that the property was being taken without
just compensation. The Supreme Court not only held that this was
a proper regulation but that it did not constitute a compensable
taking. 79
Hadacheck stands for the proposition that preventing a nuisance
does not result in a taking. Although the restriction prevented the
owner from using the property as a brick smelter, he could still
remove clay from the ground or use the land for some other purpose.80
76. Id. at 675.
77. Id. at 668-69. The Court stated:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation
does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for
lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a
declaration by the [s]tate that its use by any one, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. . . .The power which the
[sitates have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property ...
is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society,
cannot be-burdened with the condition that the state must compensate
such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason
of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to
inflict injury upon the community.
Id.
The Court drew the following conclusion:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which
is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular
way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking
property . . .without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance
only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from
an innocent owner. •
Id. at 669.
78. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
79. Id. at 410-11.
80. Id. at 411.
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Thus, while the Court based its decision on preventing a harm, the
fact that the interference with the owner's freedom of use was not
complete or absolute contributed to the Court's decision not to find
a taking.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,"' a company was dredging
in an area around which a community grew when legislation was
passed to prevent the company from continuing to use the property
in such a manner. As in Hadacheck, the restriction on use was
partial, and thus valid, because the property could be used for other
purposes.8"
Spur Indus. Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 3 decided in 1972,
resulted in a permanent injunction against the operation of a feedlot
that created a public nuisance to the residents of Sun City, an
adjacent community. The feedlot, however, pre-existed the devel-
opment of Sun City, which was settled with full knowledge of the
nearby feedlot. Therefore, the state court held that "[h]aving brought
people to the nuisance to the foreseeable detriment of [the feedlot
owner], [the developer] must [provide reimbursement] for a reason-
able amount of cost of moving or shutting down." 4 The court
noted that "[i]n addition to protecting the public interest, . . .courts
of equity are concerned with protecting the operator of a lawful,
albeit noxious, business from the result of a knowing and willful
encroachment by others near his business." 5 Thus, the court limited
the nuisance theory: " 'a party cannot justly call upon the law to
make that place suitable for his residence which was not so when
he selected it.' ",86
In 1987, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,87
the Supreme Court found that coal mine operators' underground
activities resulting in subsidence of the surface of the land constituted
a nuisance, despite the fact that the surface owners had contracted
away their rights in the "support estate." ' 88 The majority observed:
"[P]rivate individuals that erred in taking a risk cannot estop the
81. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
82. Id. at 593.
83. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
84. Id. at 186, 494 P.2d at 708.
85. Id. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706.
86. Id. at 185, 494 P.2d at 707 (quoting Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448,
455 (1871)).
87. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). See infra notes 149-83 and accompanying text for
a more thorough discussion of this case.
88. 107 S. Ct. at 1250-51. See infra notes 154-88 for a detailed discussion of
this case.
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[s]tate from exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a
public nuisance." 8 9
B. The Harm/Benefit Theory
As land use regulation moved beyond merely preventing nuisances,
courts had to develop approaches that would balance the intended
objective of the regulation against its impact on individuals' property
rights. One early attempt was the harm/benefit theory. Under this
theory, the threshold question focused on whether the regulation
causing an interference with use arose from the governing body's
desire to prevent harm to society, or to bestow a benefit on society.
This distinction is important. When the regulation was intended to
prevent a harm, courts have traditionally permitted substantial in-
terference with use on a nuisance theory without considering the
interference a taking. When the regulation aims at promoting a
benefit, however, courts have traditionally been more willing to rule
the interference a taking.
The harm/benefit analysis, however, frequently does not resolve
the problem. It is quite simple to argue that the purpose of the
regulation is both to prevent a harm and to benefit society. For
example, a city regulation creates an open space buffer zone between
itself and a neighboring urban community. Is the purpose of this
zoning to prevent a harm to the populace due to over-urbanization
and its resulting problems? Is the purpose to promote the benefit
of open space and preservation of the natural landscape for future
generations? Or is the purpose to accomplish both of these objectives?
One case that specifically addressed the harm/benefit dichotomy
was Just v. iarinette County.9° The Justs' property fell within a
shoreland zoning restriction designed to preserve and protect wa-
terfront properties. To facilitate development, Just filled a portion
of his lakefront property in violation of the ordinance. He then
contended that the restrictions on his land were unconstitutional;
that is, they restricted his use so severely that they amounted to a
taking.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted the distinction between
the need to promote a benefit and the need to prevent a harm:
It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain
because it is useful to the public, and under the police power
89. 107 S. Ct. at 1243.
90. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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because it is harmful. . . .From this results the difference between
the power of eminent domain and the police power, that the
former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on
principle does not. Thus the necessity for monetary compensation
for loss suffered to an owner by police power restriction arises
when restrictions are placed on property in order to create a
public benefit rather than to prevent a public harm.9'
Evaluating the zoning ordinance, the court found a predominant
purpose of preventing a harm to the public by restricting the property
owners' rights to change the natural character of the land. 92 The
court held that the ordinance did not result in a taking of the Justs'
property because it did "not create or improve the public conditioi
but only preserve[d] nature from the despoilage and harm resulting
from the unrestricted activities of humans." 93
In contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in State v.
Johnson,94 found that the purpose of a similar prohibition on the
filling of coastal wetlands was to promote a benefit (the preservation
of a valuable natural resource) and therefore resulted in a taking
of the defendants' property. 95 The court concluded:
As distinguished from conventional zoning for town protection,
the area of Wetlands representing a "valuable natural resource
of the [state," . . . is of state-wide concern. The benefits from
its preservation extend beyond town limits and are state-wide. The
cost of its preservation should be publicly borne. To leave ap-
pellants with commercially valueless land in upholding the re-
striction presently imposed, is to charge them with more than
their just share of the cost of this state-wide conservation pro-
gram ....
91. Id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767 (quoting E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER
§ 511 (1904)).
92. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. The court cited a letterhead from the county
zoning department: "The land belongs to the people ... a little of it to those
dead ... some to those living ... but most of it belongs to those yet to be
born .... ." Id. at 24 n.6, 201 N.W.2d at 771 n.6.
93. Id. at 24, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
94. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
95. Id. at 716. After being denied the requisite fill permit under the state's
Wetlands Act, the Johnsons nonetheless filled their land in order to make it usable
for residential development. Without fill, the land had no commercial value. The
[c]ourt identified the issue as being "[b]etween the public interest in braking and
eventually stopping the insidious despoliation of our natural resources which have
for so long been taken for granted, on the one hand, and the protection of
appellants' property rights on the other." Id.
96. Id. The court went on to say that the Johnsons' "compensation by sharing
in the benefits which this restriction is intended to secure is so disproportionate
to their deprivation of reasonable use that such exercise of the [s]tate's police power
is unreasonable." Id.
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C. Pennsylvania Coal: The Confusion Begins
As land use regulation continued to become more pervasive and
sophisticated, courts moved beyond the threshold question of whether
the purpose of enacting a regulation was to prevent a harm or to
promote a benefit to society. To determine what constitutes a taking,
a variety of tests developed. Nonetheless, the problem still remains:
when do such restrictions on use constitute a taking?
The 1922 landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon97 is
the source of most of the regulatory takings tests utilized by courts
today. Justice Holmes laid the groundwork for a variety of tests:
a confiscatory test, a substantial interference with use test, a di-
minished value test, and a reciprocity of advantage test. All involve
the extent to which there is an interference with the freedom of use
rather than with possession. Unfortunately, much of the confusion
in the courts for the past sixty-five years over the regulatory takings
issue goes back to the broad brush approach employed both by
Holmes in the majority opinion, and by Justice Brandeis in his
dissent98 in Pennsylvania Coal. In fact, the Supreme Court today
continues to rely almost exclusively on the language of Holmes and
Brandeis in deciding land use and regulatory takings cases. The case
thus provides a convenient framework for examining the current
theories employed in analyzing regulatory takings cases, particularly
in light of the Court's 1987 decision in the closely parallel case of
Keystone Bituminous Coal.99
Pennsylvania Coal dealt with the coal company's rights to remove
coal from land which it owned. The company conveyed the surface
estate to the plaintiff in 1878 but expressly reserved the right to
remove coal from the property.' °° In 1921, the Pennsylvania Leg-
islature passed the Kohler Act' 0' which prohibited the mining of
coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used
as a human habitation. Thus, the case presented a classic confron-
tation between owners' property interests and the government's right
to regulate land use to promote homeowners' welfare. Application
of the statute would destroy the coal company's property interest
in the support estate, with the result that it could not mine coal
from the property.
97. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
98. Id. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
99. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). See infra notes 149-83 and accompanying text.
100. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
101. See 1921 PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 52, §§ 661-672.10 (Purdon 1966).
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Justice Brandeis' dissent laid out the nuisance theory, which was
the controlling approach at that time. Finding that the purpose of
the regulation was to prevent a harm,'0 2 he concluded:
[Tihe right of the owner to use his land is not absolute. He may
not so use it as to create a public nuisance; and uses, once
harmless, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten
the public welfare. Whenever they do, the legislature has power
to prohibit such uses without paying compensation. . . . But re-
striction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals
from dangers threatened is not a taking.103
Writing the majority opinion that was apparently at least in part
a response to Brandeis' dissent, Justice Holmes asserted that the
purpose of the Kohler Act was to secure a public benefit. He
expressed his conclusion in harm/benefit theory language: "[A) strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving this desire by the shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change."'0
Nonetheless, Holmes also peppered his opinion with a potpourri
of approaches to the regulatory takings problem that subsequent
courts have used as the foundation for today's melange of takings
tests.
The clearest of the several tests enunciated by Justice Holmes has
been given a variety of names, but will be referred to in this Article
-as a confiscatory test. In essence, this test states that if the regulation
in question interferes with an individual's freedom of use to the
extent that there is no feasible way to use the property (or property
interest), it is a confiscation of the property and therefore must be
considered a "taking."' 0 5 Factually, what the Kohler Act did to the
coal company's property right (the right to remove coal from beneath
the surface of the land) was to destroy it entirely.1"6
102. Whether this harm can be characterized as a public nuisance or as merely
a private nuisance is arguable, and could have been a factor in determining whether
to apply a nuisance-like test. Justice Holmes, in fact, alluded to this problem when
he said: "If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone we
should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient
to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected
rights." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
103. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 416.
105. Id. at 414 ("the extent of the taking is great. It purports to abolish what
is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate-and
what is declared by the [c]ourt below to be a contract hitherto binding the plaintiffs").
106. Id.
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Less clear was Justice Holmes' reference to what may be called
the substantial interference with use test.1'° "The general rule ...
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'' 0 His
attempt to define this standard also fell short of a workable formula:
"When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act.'" 10 9
Possibly the most frequently used test introduced by Holmes is
the diminished value test."0 Again, he took a broad brush approach,
and left for future courts the job of creating a usable standard:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution.
Justice Holmes used another expression, "commercially impracti-
cable,""' 2 which some modern courts have applied as one of the
indicators of whether property values have diminished to that "certain
magnitude" that constitutes a compensable taking under the fifth
amendment.
107. This test is intended to be a catch-all solution that does not rely on economics
as does the diminished value test, on complete interference with use as does the
confiscatory test, or on an expectation of ownership as does the contract approach.
For an example of this test's modern application by the courts, see infra notes
115-16 and accompanying text.
108. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
109. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
110. The courts have given this test a variety of names, including "reasonable
beneficial use" in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 119
(1978); "economically viable use" in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980);
"economic value" in Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 138,
173 A.2d 785, 787 (L. Div. 1961); "economic return" in Sheerr v. Evesham
Township., 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46, 69-70 (L. Div. 1982); "profitable
use" in Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 225, 15 N.E.2d 587,
589 (1938); and "reasonable income productive or other private use" in Fred F.
French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 591, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383
(1976). Modern applications of this approach are discussed at length at notes 119-
42 and accompanying text.
111. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
112. Id. at 414.
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Justice Holmes made vague reference to yet another test when he
distinguished this case from an earlier coal company case, Plymouth
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania."3 In that case, legislation required the
coal company to leave pillars of coal to protect the safety of
employees of that mine and adjoining mines. Holmes recognized the
contractual relationship between individuals possessed of property
and the government. He stated that the law at issue "was a re-
quirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and
secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized
as a justification of various laws.' 1' 4
Where did Pennsylvania Coal leave the courts? Since the Court
articulated these diverse theories, the issue of regulatory takings has
remained unresolved despite the fact that courts have struggled in
a series of cases to create a formula to use in determining whether
a taking has occurred. Much of today's confusion arises from the
fact that the courts are still using the tests-all of them-articulated
in Pennsylvania Coal. For example, in Rippley v. City of Lincoln,"5
the city, intending eventually to use Rippley's property for a school
and other governmental facilities, rezoned the property for public
use only. The court referred to the substantial interference with use
approach and simply used reasonable use as its basis for finding a
taking. 116
The Supreme Court applied the average reciprocity of advantage
test in Hodel v. Irving,"7 a 1987 case involving the right to alienate
certain interests in Indian lands. Justice O'Connor stated:
[Tihere is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage"
... to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain
a nexus to the Tribe .... The owners of escheatable interests
often benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests.
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum of
the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more productive
than fractionated lands.'8
113. 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
114. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). The most recent land
use cases have referred to this reciprocity of advantage to support an ill-defined
diminished value theory.
115. 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983).
116. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted). The court stated that "Lincoln's zoning
ordinance ... destroys all reasonable use of the Rippleys' property leaving the
Rippleys at the mercy of [the city] as to a future date, if ever, that the latter may
be willing to purchase the property .... ." Id.
117. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
118. Id. at 2083 (citation omitted).
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Another Pennsylvania Coal approach still used today is the dimin-
ished value test. In attempting to define this test, one of the economic
formulas that courts have used is the beneficial use approach which
provides that depriving the owner of the most beneficial use of his
property may constitute a taking. For example, the New York courts
applied the concept of "reasonable beneficial use" in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City.1 9 After New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law designated Grand Central Terminal a "land-
mark, ' 120 the owners had to acquire a special certificate before they
made any changes or additions to the structure. To increase their
profits from the property, they wanted to build a fifty-five-story
office tower on top of the terminal. Because the structure was within
the zoning restrictions for the area, the owner would most likely
have secured approval had the terminal not been designated a land-
mark. The state court held that the owners "could sustain their
constitutional claims only by proof that the regulation deprived them
of all reasonable beneficial use of the property,"'' 2' a burden Penn
Central was not able to sustain.
In holding that no taking had occurred, the Supreme Court noted
that Penn Central did not lose all use of the property, 122 since use
of the terminal itself still generated income to the owners. 23 More-
over, the Act provided for transfer of development rights. 24 Since
Penn Central owned several other properties eligible to receive these
development rights, a showing that the owners "had been deprived
of the property's most profitable use ... did not establish that
appellants had been unconstitutionally deprived of their property."'2 5
The Court concluded that "[tihe restrictions imposed are substantially
119. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
120. Id. at 115-16.
121. Id. at 119; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d
324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
122. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. Here again is a reference to the confiscatory
test which continues as one of the undercurrents contributing to the complexity of
the problem.
123. Id. at 136.
124. For a discussion of transferable development rights, see Boast, Transferable
Development Rights, 1984 N.Z.L.J. 339; Delaney, Kominers & Gordon, TDR
Redux." A Second Generation of Practical Legal Concerns, 15 URB. LAW. 593
(1983); Malone, The Future of Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme
Court, 73 Ky. L.J. 759 (1985); Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning
Lot Merger and the Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 867 (1984);
Pedowitz, Transferable Development Rights, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 604
(1984); Richards, Transferable Development Rights: Corrective, Catastrophe, or
Curiosity?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 26 (1983).
125. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 120.
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related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit
reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford ap-
pellants opportunities further to enhance not only the terminal site
proper but also other properties."' '2 6
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,'27 the plaintiff owned five acres of
land that were bought for residential development. The defendant-
city rezoned the land for residential planned development and open
space. Theoretically, the plaintiff could build up to five houses on
the property, but he had submitted no development plans.
The Court concluded that application of the ordinance was pre-
mature in light of the plaintiff's ability to build one to five houses.
Also, the plaintiff had not yet submitted and been turned down for
a building permit. Furthermore, the Court held that the mere en-
actment of the ordinance did not constitute a taking of the plaintiff's
property:
The application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land. The determination that governmental action con-
stitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public
at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an
exercise of state power in the public interest.
The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the
public .... Appellants . . . will share with other owners the ben-
efits and burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In
assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these benefits must
be considered along with any diminution in market value that the
appellants might suffer .... Although the ordinances limit de-
velopment, they neither prevent the best use of appellants' land,
... nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership.'12
In 1985, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., -9 in
determining when federal wetlands regulations under the Clean Water
Act may constitute a taking, the Court again stated that before it
found a taking, it first had to determine the extent to which the
regulation denied the owner economically viable use of the property.
For a unanimous Court, Justice White stated:
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in
a certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the
126. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
127. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
128. Id. at 260-62 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
129. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
REGULATORY TAKINGS
property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit
system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the land-
owner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the
permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the
owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial
is to prevent "economically viable" use of the land in question
can it be said that a taking has occurred. 30
In Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 3 ' the New Jersey court
attempted to define the diminished value test by using an economic
value approach. The city had zoned plaintiffs' property for only
school or park purposes. In finding that a taking had occurred, the
court stated:
[A]s a practical matter the effect of the zoning ordinance is to
limit the purchaser to defendant borough or to the Board of
Education .... The net result of the ordinance is to destroy for
all practical purposes the full value of plaintiffs' property and to
leave plaintiffs at the mercy of defendant as to the price that the
latter may be willing to pay.'32
In Sheerr v. Evesham Township,' the same court found that private
property placed in an environmental protection zone had been taken
because the "ordinance denied any private use of the property . .. ."
As such, all economic return from the property was prevented., 4
The court stressed that "diminution in value is a consideration but
130. Id. at 127 (emphasis added). As to the facts of this particular case, the
Court issued the following statement:
Because the Corps has now denied respondent a permit to fill its property,
respondent may well have a ripe claim that a taking has occurred....
[Hiowever, . . . no evidence has been introduced that bears on the question
of the extent to which denial of a permit to fill this property will prevent
economically viable uses of the property or frustrate reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations.
Id. at 129 n.6. As to the available remedies, the Court stated:
We have held that, in general, "[e]quitable relief is not available to
enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, . . . when
a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent
to a taking." . . . This maxim rests on the principle that so long as
compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the
governmental action is not unconstitutional.
Id. at 127-28 (citations omitted). The Court clarified its position on the availability
of compensation for temporary takings in First English Evangelical Church. See
infra notes 184-95.
131. 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961).
132. Id. at 141, 173 A.2d at 787.
133. 184 N.J. Super. 11, 37, 445 A.2d 46, 60 (L. Div. 1982).
134. Id.
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it is the denial of beneficial use (obviously affecting value) that
counts most." '35
The New. York courts considered profitable use in Arverne Bay
Const. Co. v. Thatcher.3 6 There, the city had placed the plaintiff's
property in a residential zone, although the plaintiff claimed, and
had conclusively shown, that "at no time since the amendment of
the zoning resolution could its property be profitably used for res-
idential purposes."' 3 7 While conceding that the long-term goal of
the zoning restriction was to benefit the public, the court concluded
that "the plaintiff's land cannot at present or in the immediate
future be profitably or reasonably used without violation of the
restriction." The court noted that "the situation, of course, might
be quite different where it appears that within a reasonable time
the property can be put to a profitable use."'38 Because any "prog-
nostication that the district will in time become suited for residences
rests upon hope and not upon certainty,"' 13 9 the court found there
was no expectation that a profitable use within the zoning restrictions
would be available to plaintiff within the foreseeable future.
In Fred F. French Inv. Co., Inc. v. City of New* York, 40 the
city's "rezoning of buildable private parks exclusively as parks open
to the public, thereby prohibiting all rehsonable income productive
or other private use of the property,' 14' resulted in a taking. The
court observed that "[t]he [sitate may not, under the guise of
regulation by zoning ... destroy all but a bare residue of its economic
value."' 4 2
In summary, the courts have yet to develop an all-encompassing
formula for judging regulatory takings that works beyond the limited
facts of the specific case. The nuisance or benefit/burden test, the
confiscatory test, the substantial interference with use test, and the
diminished value/economic impact test all have inherent limitations,
exacerbated by the inconsistency of application both among and
within the various jurisdictions. The Supreme Court decided Penn-
sylvania Coal before Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 43 at a time when
municipalities had not yet contemplated, let alone attempted, many
135. Id. at 53-54, 445 A.2d at 68-69 (emphasis in original).
136. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
137. Id. at 228, 15 N.E.2d at 590.
138. Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
141. Id. at 590-91, 350 N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 591, 350 N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
143. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (validating zoning as within scope of police power).
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currently accepted land use restrictions. Yet the Supreme Court
continues to rely almost exclusively on the language of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis in deciding land use and regulatory takings
cases. 'I
IV. The 1987 Decisions: The Confusion Continues
In 1987, the Supreme Court handed down three regulatory takings
decisions: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,'4 First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles,' 46 and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n.147 These de-
cisions continue the confusion begun by Pennsylvania Coal.
Keystone presented a factual situation nearly identical to that in
Pennsylvania Coal, but resulted in the opposite conclusion, i.e., that
no taking had occurred. First English addressed the question whether
compensation must be paid for temporary regulatory takings, with
the Court 'deciding that compensation must be paid, an approach
to temporary takings first proposed by Justice Brennan in his dissent
to San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego. 48 Nollan addressed
whether a regulatory taking occurs when public land dedications are
required as a precondition to the issuance of a building permit. The
Court found that a taking will result unless the dedication requirement
is sufficiently tailored to the alleged public purpose.
A. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis:
Pennsylvania Coal Revisited
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ' 9 the Court
confronted the same conflict between surface land owners and coal
companies that Justices Holmes and Brandeis addressed in Penn-
sylvania Coal. Both cases involved the problem of potential sub-
sidence of the surface land above the mining operations, and state
legislation designed to prevent such subsidence. While the 1922 case
dealt with the Kohler Act,15 0 the 1987 case dealt with the Bituminous
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act. 5 ' Both cases also
144. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
145. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
146. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
147. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
148. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
150. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-672.10 (Purdon 1966).
151. See id. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-1406.21 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
1988]
222 FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
involved property in which the mineral and support estates had been
severed from the surface estate by contract. Pennsylvania law has
long recognized these three separate estates in land.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Keystone, stated that
Pennsylvania Coal did not control.'52 The Court concluded that the
Subsidence Act did not effect a taking of the coal companies' interest
in the mineral and support estates, despite the factual similarities
to Pennsylvania Coal.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent opened by protesting the ma-
jority's attempt to "dismiss the precedential value''' 54 of Justice
Holmes' decision. Rehnquist pointed out that "the holding in Penn-
sylvania Coal today discounted by the Court has for [sixty-five]
years been the foundation of our 'regulatory takings' jurispru-
dence." "'5
The majority did not actually dismiss the precedential value of
the Pennsylvania Coal opinion. Rather, it picked through the variety
of approaches to regulatory takings suggested in the decision and
then selected those that supported its conclusion. In dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist did the same.
This hunt-and-peck method aptly points out both the strengths
and weaknesses of Pennsylvania Coal: The case suggested so many
approaches that it created confusion by giving subsequent jurists too
much with which to work, and none of it precise. Justice Rehnquist
said: "I would have no doubt that our repeated reliance on that
opinion establishes it as a cornerstone of the jurisprudence of the
[f]ifth [a]mendment's [j]ust [c]ompensation [cllause. "156 A five-to-
four decision' by the Court always generates some question about
the factors motivating each of the Justices' opinions. Thus, these
two very similar cases, decided sixty-five years apart, can be evaluated
to determine why they resulted in opposite conclusions based on the
same facts.
At the time of the earlier decision, coal was America's most
important energy product. Thus, the coal companies' influence upon
the economy was far greater than today. This is not to say that
152. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1240.
153. Id. at 1242-43.
154. Id. at 1253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157. Justice Stevens delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justices Powell, O'Connor and Scalia joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
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the Supreme Court was affected by a particular special interest group,
but rather that the Justices must consider society as a whole in
making their decisions. One wonders whether the Court would have
reached the same decision in Keystone had the case involved the oil
industry rather than the coal industry.
In 1922, the weighing of benefits and burdens was the most
common approach to judging regulatory takings. The public benefit
reasons cited by the Pennsylvania Legislature for passing the Kohler
Act tipped the balance in favor of compensation to the coal com-
panies. As Justice Holmes said, "a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by the shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change." 5'
But in 1987, reciprocity of advantage was gaining acceptance as
the appropriate balancing test for regulatory takings problems. In
the words of the Keystone Court:
Under our system of government, one of the state's primary ways
of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals
can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat
by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the res-
trictions that are placed on others.' 59
The Keystone majority referred to the Pennsylvania Legislature's
"conclusion that . . . existing mine subsidence legislation had failed
to protect the public interest in safety, land conservation, preservation
of affected municipalities' tax base, and land development .... 1160
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he central purposes of the
Act, though including public safety, reflect a concern for the pres-
ervation of buildings, economic development, and maintenance of
property values to sustain the Commonwealth's tax base.' 16' In recent
years, such concerns have increasingly motivated the courts to uphold
land use restrictions that probably would have been overturned under
a benefit/burden analysis. 62
Another factor that has changed considerably over the past sixty-
five years is the heightened interest in consumer protection. At the
158. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
159. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1245.
160. Id. at 1236 (referring to bases for new legislation).
161. Id. at 1257 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
162. Rehnquist warned against this trend: "We should hesitate to allow a reg-
ulation based on essentially economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates
of the [fifth [a]mendment by labeling it nuisance regulation." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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time of the enactment of the Kohler Act, the individual whose
property value may have been reduced or whose homesite might
have been completely destroyed by the subsidence of the land would
have been told, "caveat emptor. '' 61 Today's society is more likely
to say, "vendor beware."
For example, in Pennsylvania Coal, the coal company had bar-
gained for and paid value to Mahon for the rights to the support
estate. Mahon later claimed this bargain was unfair. Expressing the
attitude of his day, Justice Holmes stated that "[slo far as private
persons and communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring
only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has
become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than
they bought." '
For at least the past thirty years, however, the Court has recognized
protection of the consumer, even after a valid contract has been
formed. 65 Considering these social and economic changes, the Court's
conclusion does not appear so anomalous.
In Keystone, the Court first differentiated the Kohler Act from
the Subsidence Act on the basis of legislative intent. The Court
found the Kohler Act was primarily a "private benefit" statute
designed to protect individual property owners. 66 In contrast, the
Subsidence Act was intended to protect a wider public interest.' 67
But in dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist objected to this distinction
between the purposes of the'two acts. In his view, the Kohler Act
was passed " 'as remedial legislation designed to cure existing evils
163. Caveat emptor has been defined in the following manner:
Let the buyer beware. This maxim summarizes the rule that a purchaser
must examine, judge and test for himself. This maxim is more applicable
to judicial sales, auctions, and the like, than to sales of consumer goods
where strict liability, warranty, and other consumer protection laws protect
the consumer-buyer.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
164. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
165. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243. As Justice Stevens pointed out in Keystone:
That private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the [s]tate
from exercising its police power to abate an activity akin to a public
nuisance. The Subsidence Act is a prime example that "circumstances
may so change in time . . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest
what at other times . . . would be a matter of purely private concern."
Id. (quoting Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)).
166. Id. at 1242 (quoting Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414).
167. Id. at 1242-43. Justice Stevens stated in part, "Unlike the Kohler Act, ..
the Subsidence Act does not merely involve a balancing of the private economic
interests of coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners."
Id. at 1242.
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and abuses.' " Because these were public " 'evils and abuses,' "168
Rehnquist saw little or no difference in the public purposes behind
the two acts.
In its analysis, the Court provided a complete shopping list of
regulatory takings tests, starting with one of the original bulwarks,
the nuisance theory. Citing a litany of nuisance cases, the Court
stated that "since no individual has a right to use his property so
as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the state has not
'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-
like activity." ' 69 The Court applied the nuisance analysis to the facts
of this case, and linked it to Justice Holmes' reciprocity of advantage
language.170
Justice Rehnquist cited the same nuisance cases, but to support
his contention that application of the nuisance theory was inappro-
priate in this case.' 7 ' The Chief Justice concluded that "[a] broad
exception to the . . [j]ust [c]ompensation [c]lause based on the
exercise of multifaceted health, welfare and safety regulations would
surely allow government much greater authority than we have rec-
ognized to impose societal burdens on individual landowners" be-
cause "nearly every action the government takes is intended to secure
for the public an extra measure of health, safety and welfare."'72
Disagreement between the majority and the dissent centered on
the issue of how to measure the diminution of the coal companies'
property value resulting from the Subsidence Act. The majority
maintained that the coal required to be left in the ground, as well
as the value of the separate support estate, should be balanced
against the companies' entire interest in the property. The dissent,
on the other hand, opined that each segment of the companies'
interest in the property should be weighed separately.
168. Id. at 1255 (quoting the Act) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). Rehnquist continued, pointing out that the Pennsylvania Coal Court "did
not ignore the public interests served by the Act. When considering the protection
of the 'single private house' owned by the Mahons, the Court noted that '[nip
doubt there is a public interest even in this.' [260 U.S. at 413 . . . (emphasis
added)]." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1245 n.20.
170. Id. at 1245. The Court stated:
The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the state merely restrains
uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent
with the notion of "reciprocity of advantage" that Justice Holmes referred
to in Pennsylvania Coal. . . . These restrictions are "properly treated as
part of the burden of common citizenship."
Id.
171. Id. at 1256 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the coal
required to be left in the ground under the provisions of the Act
should be considered a separate segment of property for takings
purposes.'7 3 The majority focused on diminishing the value of the
coal companies' property interest by denying them the right to mine
approximately two percent of the available coal. 7 4 The Court's
argument was persuasive under the diminished value approach. The
Subsidence Act's restrictions did not so substantially interfere with
the coal companies' property use that mining the remaining coal
became economically infeasible. Stating that the coal companies "may
continue to mine coal profitably even if they may not destroy or
damage surface structures at will in the process,"'' 75 the Court con-
cluded that the Subsidence Act did not effect a compensable taking
of the companies' interests.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist considered separately each segment
of the property interest in determining whether a taking had occurred.
With regard to the coal required to be left in the ground, he found
"no question that this coal is an identifiable and separable property
interest."'' 76 In Rehnquist's view, the coal companies should have
been compensated for the total value of the coal left in place,
regardless of whether the remaining coal could be profitably mined. 7 7
173. Justice Stevens quoted Andrus v. Allard: "[W]here an owner possesses a
full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is
not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Andrus, 444
U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979), quoted in Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
Andrus concerned the right to sell avian artifacts from species protected by federal
law, but in which the petitioners, American Indians, claimed a conflicting religious
and cultural interest. The Court pointed out that loss of the right to sell the
artifacts did not deprive the owners of their full bundle of rights, because they
could still profit from such uses as displaying the artifacts.
The Court in Keystone may have been stretching to find a quote that met its
purposes, because Andrus was not concerned with separating two feathers from a
group of 200 feathers, but rather with the variety of interests that one might have
in the ownership of avian artifacts. Id. at 1248.
174. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248.
175. Id. at 1250.
176. Id. at 1259 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist went on to say:
Unlike many property interests, the "bundle" of rights in this coal is
sparse. " 'For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right
to mine it.' " . . . From the relevant perspective-that of the property
owners-this interest has been destroyed every bit as much as if the
government had proceeded to mine the coal for its own use.
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414).
177. Rehnquist did, however, acknowledge some difference between his separate
treatment of each property segment and previous Court analysis.
There is admittedly some language in Penn Central Transportation Co.
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Not as well reasoned as its diminished value argument is the
majority's analysis of the "support estate," or "a separate interest
in land that can be conveyed apart from either the mineral estate
or the surface estate."' 78 In both Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal
the coal companies had conveyed the surface estate while retaining
both the mineral and support estates. In Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court concluded that the surface estate purchasers had taken a
calculated risk when they failed also to obtain the support interest.
Furthermore, they ought to have known that courts would not step
in after the fact to save them from a bad bargain. In Keystone,
however, the Court determined that "the support estate has value
only insofar as it protects or enhances the value of the estate with
which it is associated."' 79 Since the coal companies could continue
profitably to mine coal despite the Subsidence Act's requirements
of providing surface support, the Court held that "the burden the
Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking."'' 0
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist considered the support estate as a
separate property interest in determining the effect of the Subsidence
Act on the coal companies' property rights.' Since the support
estate holder would not find his interest to be without value, "for
surely the owners of the mineral or surface estates would be willing
buyers of this interest,' ' Is2 Rehnquist concluded that the effect of
the Subsidence Act was to extinguish the support estate in violation
of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment.8 3
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d
631 (1978), that suggests a contrary analysis: " 'Taking' jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole." The Court gave no guidance on how one is to
distinguish a "discrete segment" from a "single parcel."
Id. at 1259 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
130-31).
178. Id. at 1250.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1259-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1260 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1260-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice delivered the
following statement:
Purchase of this right [the support estate] . . . shifts the risk of subsidence
to the surface owner. Section 6 of the Subsidence Act, by making the
coal mine operator strictly liable for any damage to surface structures
19881
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B. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles: Compensation for "Temporary Takings"
Since the 1980 decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon,'8 4 the Court
had left unresolved the problem of whether compensation should
be awarded for temporary regulatory takings. The issue was whether
property owners have the right to compensation for loss of property
use resulting from restrictions that are either later struck down by
the courts, or repealed or amended by a governmental body. After
avoiding this issue on procedural grounds in a series of cases, the
Court handed down its long-awaited decision in First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.185
In 1957, the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
(church) purchased a twenty-one-acre parcel of land, which it used
as a camp for retarded children. After flooding destroyed the camp
in 1978, the property was included in an interim flood protection
area where no construction was allowed. 8 6 The church sought dam-
ages in inverse condemnation for the loss of use of its property.
In a six-to-three opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,'8 7
the Court noted that the just compensation clause "does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on
the exercise of that power ... "I That condition requires the
caused by subsidence, purports to place this risk on the holder of the
mineral estate regardless of whether the holder also owns the support
estate. Operation of this provision extinguishes the petitioners' interests
in their support estates, making worthless what they purchased as a
separate right under Pennsylvania law . . . and must be accompanied by
just compensation.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
185. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
186. Id. at 2381-82.
187. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and Scalia joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined Justice Steven's dissent in part.
188. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2385. The Court stated that "[wihile the typical
taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of
its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is
predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal pro-
ceedings." Id. at 2386. Quoting the 1872 case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company,
the Court said:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if ... it shall be
held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real
property to the uses of the public it can .... in effect, subject it to
total destruction without making any compensation, because in the nar-
rowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.
Id. at 2386-87 (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.), 166, 177-
78 (1872) (emphasis in original).
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payment of compensation for the taking. Reviewing a series of cases
involving temporary government occupations in time of war, Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that these " 'temporary' takings . . . are not
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation."'' 8 9 Noting that eight years had elapsed
since the church filed suit on the flood protection ordinance but
that the courts had not yet addressed the merits of the church's
claim, Rehnquist found that "[t]he United States has been required
to pay compensation for leasehold interests of shorter duration than
this," and "invalidation of the ordinance . . . after this period of
time . . . is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the
[j]ust [c]ompensation [cilause."'9
In response to anticipated protests from land-use planners and
financially distressed municipalities, the Court quoted the state court's
justification for disallowing damages that occurred prior to the
invalidation of the challenged regulation: " 'the need for preserving
a degree of freedom in the land-use planning function, and the
inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse condemnation
remedy.' "'19 Insisting that the decision did not limit the government's
options, such as withdrawing the regulation or proceeding with a
formal condemnation action, 92 the Court concluded "that where the
189. Id. at 2388.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2387 (quoting Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 378, aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
192. Id. at 2389. The Court made the following argument:
Nothing we say today is intended to abrogate the principle that the
decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is a legislative function,
" 'for Congress and Congress alone to determine.' " Hawaii Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240, 181 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321
(1984) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75
S. Ct. 98 (1954)). Once a court determines that a taking has occurred,
the government retains the whole range of options already available-
amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation,
or exercise of eminent domain. Thus we do not, as the Solicitor General
suggests, "permit a court, at the behest of a private person, to require
the . . . [glovernment to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. ...
We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not
deal with the quite different question that would arise in the case of
normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like which are not before us. We realize that even
our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom
and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal
corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such consequences
necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional
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government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective."'9 -
In dissent, Justice Stevens was concerned with what he perceived
a need for a "dividing line ... between everyday regulatory in-
conveniences and those so severe that they constitute takings. ' '" 94
Conceding that he was "willing to assume that some cases may
arise in which a property owner can show that prospective invali-
dation of the regulation cannot cure the taking,"' 95 he concluded:
Why should there be a constitutional distinction between a per-
manent restriction that only reduces the economic value of the
property by a fraction-perhaps one-third-and a restriction that
merely postpones the development of a property for a fraction
of its useful life-presumably far less than a third? In the former
instance, no taking has occurred; in the latter case, the Court
now proclaims that compensation for a taking must be provided.,"9
Stevens questioned whether the regulation interfered with the church's
reasonable expectations as to its future use of the property.'," He
also sounded a cautionary note as to future litigation likely to result
from the Court's decision.198
right; many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit
the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities and the [jiust
[ciompensation [cilause of the [f]ifth .[almendment is one of them.
Id.
193. Id. at 2389.
194. Id. at 2393-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2395 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens stated:
Nor did [the church] allege any facts indicating how the ordinance
interfered with any future use of the property contemplated or planned
by appellant. In light of the tragic flood and the loss of life that
precipitated the safety regulations here, it is hard to understand how
appellant ever expected to rebuild on Lutherglen.
Id.
198. Id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens issued a warning:
The policy implications of today's decision are obvious and, I fear, far
reaching. Cautious local officials and land-use planners may avoid taking
any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damage
action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps
in the health and safety area. Were this result mandated by the Con-
stitution, these serious implications would have to be ignored. But the
loose cannon the Court fires today is not only unattached to the Con-
stitution, but it also takes aim at a long line of precedents in the regulatory
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C. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n: Building Permit
Conditions as Takings
The Court's third 1987 land use decision, Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 99 addressed the issue of whether the state could
impose uncompensated public dedication requirements on the issuance
of building permits within the heavily-regulated California coastal
zone. It was hoped that the decision would provide some guidance
as to which of the regulatory takings tests would be favored by the
new Court. Instead, it applied the tests from Pennsylvania Coal-
and introduced a new one.
The Nollans had been renting beachfront property with an option
to buy. Their option was subject to their promise to demolish the
existing bungalow which had fallen into disrepair, and to replace it
with a new structure. The California Coastal Commission conditioned
issuance of a building permit for this new home on the Nollans'
allowing the public an easement to pass across their privately-owned
beach between the mean high tideline and an eight-foot concrete
seawall. 200 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court found that
such a condition constituted -a compensable taking.20,
takings area. It would be the better part of valor simply to decide the
case at hand instead of igniting the kind of litigation explosion that this
decision will undoubtedly touch off.
Id. at 2399-2400. Stevens also expressed concern over the additional burden of
constitutional analysis he sees the Court laying on the shoulders of land-use planners:
It is no answer to say that "[aifter all, if a policeman must know the
Constitution, then why not a planner?" To begin with, the Court has
repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish any objective rules
to assess when a regulation becomes a taking. How then can it demand
that land planners do any better? However confusing some of our criminal
procedure cases may be, I do not believe they have been as open-ended
and standardless as our regulatory takings cases are ....
Another critical distinction between police activity and land-use planning
is that not every missed call by a policeman gives rise to civil liability;
police officers enjoy individual immunity for actions taken in good
faith. . . . In the land regulation context, however, I am afraid that any
decision by a competent regulatory body may establish a "policy or
custom" and give rise to liability after today.
Id. at 2399-2400 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
199. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
200. Id. at 3143-44. The Superior Court of Ventura County granted the Nollans'
requested writ of mandamus and directed that the permit condition be struck. While
the case was being appealed by the Coastal Commission, the Nollans exercised
their purchase option, tore down the bungalow, and built a two-story, 1,674-square-
foot residence with an attached two-car garage.
The court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding the access requirement
valid under the constitution because the access condition was sufficiently related
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia made three points. First,
had the state required the easement outright rather than in exchange
for a building permit, the easement clearly would have resulted in
a compensable taking. To support this conclusion, Scalia pointed
out that such action constituted more than a " 'mere restriction on
its use,' ",202 but rather destroyed the property owner's basic rights
of exclusion and freedom from permanent physical invasion. In
effect, the state granted the public "a permanent and continuous
right to pass to and fro ' 20 3 across the Nollans' property.
Second, Justice Scalia urged the Court to apply a more stringent
standard when the invasion of the owner's property interest was in
exchange for a requested governmental concession. In Nollan, for
example, the government insisted on an easement in exchange for
the requested building permit. To guide the Court, Justice Scalia
detailed a stricter two-step standard of review for state actions.
Pursuant to this standard, he required that the regulatory action
substantially advance legitimate state interests, rather than merely
being reasonably related thereto. 20 4
to the burdens placed on public beach access created by the project. The court
also rejected the Nollans' takings claim because they failed to establish loss of all
reasonable use of the property. Id. at 3144.
201. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell
and O'Connor, delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in
which Justice Marshall joined. Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed separate dissents,
the latter of which Blackmun also joined.
202. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 (quoting id. at 3154 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
The Court went on to say:
Indeed, one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to
assure that the government be able to require conveyance of just such
interests, so long as it pays for them. Perhaps because the point is so
obvious, we have never been confronted with a controversy that required
us to rule upon it, but our cases' analysis of the effect of other gov-
ernmental action leads to the same conclusion. We have repeatedly held
that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, "the right to
exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.' "
Id. (citations omitted). For a further discussion of the right to exclude others, see
supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
203. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
204. Id. at 3150. Scalia observed:
[Ojur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights
through the police power as a "substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate
state interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective
where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement,
rather than the stated police power objective.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Further, Scalia required a nexus or tailored fit between the state
interest and the condition imposed to advance it.205 In Nollan, Justice
Scalia did not find a close fit between the condition and the burden.2 06
Instead, he found that the easement allowing people already on the
beach to walk across the Nollans' property did not serve the Com-
mission's purported purpose of reducing the "psychological barrier"2 7
to public beach access created by new developments blocking the
public's view of the beach from the street above.
Third, Justice Scalia warned that this heightened scrutiny test
Would require more than casual compliance by governmental
agencies. 20 1 In fact, the Commission's attempt to tailor its justification
more closely to the easement condition did not convince Justice
Scalia:
[T]he Commission's justification for the access requirement ...
[is that it] is part of a comprehensive program to provide con-
tinuous public access along Faria Beach as the lots undergo de-
velopment or redevelopment. . . . The Commission may well be
right that it is a good idea, but that does not establish that the
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be compelled to
contribute to its realization. Rather, California is free to advance
its "comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using its power of
eminent domain for this "public purpose," (citation omitted) but
if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay
for it.20
9
205. Id. at 3148. He stated:
The evident constitutional propriety disappears . . .if the condition sub-
stituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as
the justification for the prohibition .... [H]ere, the lack of nexus between
the condition ad the original purpose of the building restriction converts
that purpose to something other than what it was .... In short, unlegs
the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the de-
velopment ba4, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land
use but "an out-an-out plan of extortion.
Id. ot\dot o xoto.
206. Id. at 3148-49.
207. Id. at 3147.
208. Id. at 3150. He continued:
We do not share Justice Brennan's confidence that the Commission
"should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to
demonstrate a specific connection between provisions for access and the
burdens on access," . . . that will avoid the effect of today's decision.
We view the [f]ifth [a]mendment's property clause to be more than a
pleading requirement, and .compliance with it to be more than an exercise
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In dissent, Justice Brennan objected to the "Court's insistence on
a precise fit between the forms of burden and condition on each
individual parcel" because it "would penalize the Commission for
its flexibility ... [in trying] to balance private and public interests
and to accept tradeoffs: [that is] to permit development that reduces
access in some ways as long as other means of access are en-
hanced." 2 0 But the main thrust of his dissent dealt with the land-
owners' "reasonable expectations" as to how the Commission would
allow them to use their property, and the Court's seeming misin-
terpretation of those expectations:
The Court's demand for this precise fit is based on the assumption
that private landowners in this case possess a reasonable expec-
tation regarding the use of their land that the public has attempted
to disrupt. In fact, the situation is precisely the reverse: it is
private landowners who are the interlopers. 2 '
Brennan pointed out that the California Constitution has contained
a beach-access mandate since 1879.22' Moreover, the Nollans, along
with all other lessees in the same beach tract, had never "interfered
with public use of the beachfront, . . . so long as public use was
limited to pass and re-pass lateral access along the shore." 21 Thus,
he concluded:
[A]ppellants can make no reasonable claim to any expectation of
being able to exclude members of the public from crossing the
edge of their property to gain access to the ocean .... California
... has clearly established that the power of exclusion for which
appellants seek compensation simply is not a strand in the bundle
of appellants' property rights, and appellants have never acted as
if it were. Given this state of affairs, appellants cannot claim
that the deed restriction has deprived them of a reasonable ex-
pectation to exclude from their property persons desiring to gain
access to the sea. 214
Brennan reminded the Court that "[tihe fact that the Commission's
action is a legitimate exercise of the police power does not, of course,
insulate it from a takings challenge. ' 21 5 Then applying traditional
takings tests to the facts in this case, he included the diminished
210. Id. at 3153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
213. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 3158-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 3156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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value test, the investment-backed expectations test and the reciprocity
of advantage test. 216
Finally, Justice Brennan returned to his expectations analysis, and
found that when appellants requested a new development permit
they "were clearly on notice ... [that] stringent regulation of de-
velopment along the California coast had been in place at least since
1976. ' ' 27 Because the state had imposed the same public access
requirements on forty-three other developments in the same beach
tract since 1979, the Nollans "could have no reasonable expectations
of, and had no entitlement to, approval of their permit application
without any deed restriction ensuring public access to the ocean." 21 8
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens cautioned the Court on its
current direction in land-use rulings. He also pointed out the con-
fusion in this area of the law. Referring to the Court's adoption
in First English of Brennan's dissenting view in San Diego Gas &
Elec., concerning compensation for temporary takings, Justice Stev-
ens expressed his concern over the lack of coherent policy in balancing
public and private interests in land use regulation:
I write today to identify the severe tension between that dramatic
development in the law and the view expressed by Justice Brennan's
dissent in this case that the public interest is served by encouraging
state agencies to exercise considerable flexibility in responding to
private desires for development in a way that threatens the pres-
ervation of public resources .... I like the hat that Justice Brennan
has donned today better than the one he wore in San Diego, and
I am persuaded that he has the better of the legal arguments
here. Even if his position prevailed in this case, however, it would
be of little solace to land-use planners who would still be left
guessing about how the Court will react to the next case, and
216. Id. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As to this last test, Brennan said:
Allowing appellants to intensify development along the coast in exchange
for ensuring public access to the ocean is a classic instance of government
action that produces a "reciprocity of advantage." . . . Such development
obviously significantly increases the value of appellants' property....
Furthermore, appellants gain anadditional benefit from the Commission's
permit condition program. They are able to walk along the beach beyond
the confines of their own property only because the Commission has
required deed restrictions as a condition of approving other new beach
developments. Thus, appellants benefit both as private landowners and
as members of the public from the fact that new development permit
requests are conditioned on preservation of public access.
Id. (footnote omitted).
217. Id. at 3159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 3160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the one after that. . . . Like Justice Brennan, I hope "that a
broader vision ultimately prevails." 219
Justice Brennan's dissent did not provide the clarity desperately
needed in this area of law. He applied many of the now-standard
tests and introduced a new element of reasonable expectations not
previously utilized by the Court. On the other hand, the majority's
opinion created an additional element of a "tailored fit" without
clarifying or eliminating any of the existing takings tests, which were
conspicuous by their absence from Justice Scalia's opinion. Brennan's
reasonable expectations analysis, however, may guide the Court in
fashioning a predictable yet flexible standard for judging regulatory
takings cases.
V. A Contract Approach to Regulatory Takings: A Viable
Alternative
How can the takings problem be resolved? The various and in-
consistent approaches of the state and federal courts have not pro-
vided an answer. The solution is not to limit takings to those
situations in which a physical possession or invasion occurs. It is
clear that the bundle of rights that is associated with property goes
far beyond physical possession or the right to exclude others from
the property. Within that bundle is an essential stalk which includes
the freedom to use property in any lawful manner provided it does
not constitute a nuisance. Moreover, limitations on the freedom of
use that go beyond preventing a nuisance must be considered not
only in light of whether they are constitutionally permissible under
the tenth and fourteenth amendments, but also in light of whether
the interference is such that it constitutes a taking for which com-
pensation must be given under the fifth amendment.220
The solution is to view the relationship between the government
and the individual property owner as a contract. Thus, in analyzing
the rights of private individuals and the government, courts can
apply well-founded contractual principles.
This contract approach to property problems is not new. As early
as 1798, the Supreme Court explained the relationship between the
state and the individual in the ownership of property in contract
terms:
It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could
only arise from compact express or implied, and I think it the
219. Id. at 3163-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See supra notes 69-73, 97-144 and accompanying text.
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better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode, or manner
of acquiring property, and of alienating or transferring, inheriting,
or transmitting it, is conferred by society; is regulated by civil
institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by positive
law. When I say, that a right is vested in a citizen, I mean, that
he has the power to do certain actions; or to possess certain
things, according to the law of the land. 22'
Fifty years later, the Court expressly called the relationship a contract
and indicated that without this relationship "the law of property
would be simply the law of force":
Under every established government, the tenure of property is,
derived mediately or immediately from the sovereign power of
the political body. . . . [1]t is undeniable, that the investment of
property in the citizen by the government . . . is a contract between
the state, or the government acting as its agent, and the grantee;
and both parties thereto are bound in good faith to fulfill it.222
The Court went on to discuss the conditions attached to performance
of this contract, and the government's rights and obligations under
the taking clause:
But into all contracts . . . there enter conditions which arise not
out of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced
by the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws of nature,
of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong;
they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known
and recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never,
therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could add
nothing to their force. Such a condition is the right of eminent
domain. This right does not operate to impair the contract effected
by it, but recognizes its obligations in the fullest extent, claiming
only the fulfilment of an essential and inseparable condition. Thus,
in claiming a resumption or qualification of an investiture, it
insists merely on the true nature and character of the right in-
vested. 23
In a variety of cases in which the property of an individual has
been condemned by the government, the courts have recognized that
such an implied contract exists. For example, in United States v.
Great Falls Mfg. Co.,2-4 the Court stated:
221. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798).
222. West River Bridge v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531-32 (1848).
223. Id.
224. 112 U.S. 645 (1884).
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The law will imply a promise to make the required compensation,
where property, to which the government asserts no title, is taken,
pursuant to an [A]ct of Congress, as private property to be applied
for public use[s]. Such an implication being consistent with the
constitutional duty of the government, as well as with common
justice, the claimant's cause of action is one that arises out of
implied contract .... "I
Similarly, it was held, in Danforth v. United States,26 that where
the government takes land for flood control and the value of the
land taken exceeds any possible flood benefit, a contract to pay the
value of that land will be implied. Again, in United States v. Georgia
Marble Co.,227 where the government seized and converted to its
own use property in the possession of a defaulting contractor but
which was owned by a third party, the court held that the owner
could recover against the United States upon a theory of implied
contract. This contractual interpretation of the relationship between
the state and the individual property owner applies equally to inverse
condemnation or regulatory takings.
A. The Contract Approach
In all contractual relationships, there are certain expectations on
the part of the parties involved and certain risks that they either
have assumed, or as reasonable people, should have assumed. 28 The
relationship between the individual land owner and the government
is similar to a contract in which each party recognizes there is some
risk of loss and expectation of gain. It is this expectation, or
awareness of risk, that should be the focal point of the courts'
decisions. Thus, where the governmental action or regulation goes
beyond the risks that a reasonable person should have anticipated,
or eliminates an expectation that a reasonable individual would have
contemplated, then such governmental action or regulation constitutes
225. Id. at 656-57 (emphasis added).
226. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
227. 106 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1939).
228. One scholar has concisely described this situation:
One who is considering whether or not to make a contract ordinarily
makes a number of assumptions in assessing the benefits he will
receive and the burdens he will shoulder under the proposed exchange
of performances. Some assumptions relate to facts that exist at the time
the contract is made .... Other assumptions relate to events that are
expected to occur or circumstances that are expected to exist at sonic
later time.
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.1 (1982).
REGULATORY TAKINGS
a taking. In pursuing the contract approach, one must resolve two
problems: (1) when do the property owner's expectations and con-
templated risks arise; and (2) what are those risks and expectations?
1. When Risks and Expectations Arise
In any contract, risks and expectations may arise before formation,
at formation, or during the performance of the contract. However,
the most obvious time that risks and expectations are contemplated
is when the contract is formed. Except in a written contract dated
and signed by both parties, however, the exact time of formation
may not be clear. Normally, the contract between the property owner
and the government has not been expressly stated, dated or signed.
Few, if any, words have passed between the two parties. Nevertheless,
the conduct of the parties creates this relationship, traditionally called
an implied-in-fact contract.2 29
To determine the risks and expectations of an implied-in-fact
contract, courts must consider several well established contractual
principles: (1) "usage" 2 -0-the circumstances that existed prior to
the contract's formation; and (2) "course of dealing ' 23' or "course
of performance" 32-the conduct of the parties both before and after
the creation of the implied agreement.
2. The Scope of Risks and Expectations
The second step in a contract analysis is to determine the risks
and expectations of the property owner, which the courts must
229. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 19 (3d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter CALAMARI & PERILLO]; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
230. "Usage is habitual or customary practice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 219 (1979). "Scope of Usage.... A particular usage may be more or
less widespread. It may prevail throughout an area, and the area may be small or
large-a city, a state or a larger region .... Usages change over time ..... Id.
§ 219 comment a.
"An agreement is interpreted in accordance with a relevant usage if each party
knew or had reason to know of the usage ...... Id. § 220.
"An agreement or term thereof need not be stated in words if the parties manifest
assent to it by other conduct, and such assent is often manifested by conduct in
accordance with usage." Id. § 220 comment c.
231. "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties
to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Id.
§ 223; see also U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1978).
232. "Where the contract ... involves repeated occasions for performance ...
with . . . opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the
meaning of the agreement." U.C.C. § 2-208 (1978).
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consider in evaluating the governmental regulation. Courts should
include in this analysis the nature of the property owner. Contract
law has long recognized that the competence, education, background
and expertise of the individual entering into the contract are factors
to be considered in determining the risks and expectations of the
contracting parties.2 3 For example, a sophisticated owner, such as
a developer, has more experience with land use regulation than the
individual who has owned the same family residence for forty years.
These criteria are not precise. Courts, however, have successfully
applied them in contract law, particularly where the Uniform Com-
mercial Code distinguishes between merchants and non-merchants.23 4
233. Much of the law of contracts rests on an ethic of self-reliance. When
negotiating an agreement, each individual is charged with the burden of looking
out for his own self-interest.
The self-reliance ethic presupposes, as a model, parties who understand
the legal consequences of the agreement and who have equal bargaining
power or, at least, who are equally free to refuse to bargain unless their
terms are met. Today however, the realities of the market often are at
variance with that presupposition. (N.2. W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER,
THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE: THE PLIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSUMER (1969); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963); cf. K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 401-41 (1960); Rothschild
& Throne, Criminal Consumer Fraud: A Victim-Oriented Analysis,
74 Mich. L. Rev. 661 (1976)).
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 229, at 429.
Recognition of the lack of education, expertise or bargaining ability has, in our
modern society, led to the enactment of a variety of legislation that addresses this
imbalance. Some examples are the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the Truth in
Lending Simplification and Reform Act, the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Real Estate Settlements
Procedures Act, and the Uniform Commercial Code, particularly § 2-302 dealing
with unconscionability.
234. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "merchant" in the following manner:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978). Comment I provides that "[tihis Article assumes that
transactions between professionals in a given field require special and clear rules
which may not apply to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer .... Id. § 2-
104 comment 1.
As Official Comment 2 to § 2-104 points out, the term merchant can be applied
in several ways. It can be applied broadly to include "almost every person in
business ... under the language 'who ... by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices ... involved in the trans-
action .... .' " Id. § 2-104 comment 2. The term can also be applied more narrowly
to relate to only a particular kind of goods: "if the seller is a merchant with
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Thus, there is no reason to doubt that they can be applied to a
fifth amendment takings problem. In fact, as early as 140 years ago
Justice Daniel voiced this concept in the property-ownership con-
text. 35
Part of a property owner's conception of risks and expectations
includes the expectation that the property will not be physically
possessed or invaded by another. Thus, the owner has the right to
exclude others from possession of his property. An owner can also
expect to be able to alienate the property and to use the property
in any lawful manner. Such use, however, may not constitute a
nuisance, or violate any existing governmental regulations. Further,
the owner should anticipate future reasonable governmental regu-
lations.
The concepts of good faith and fair dealing also apply to the
conduct of both the state and the individual.236 This thread is not
only woven throughout the fabric of contracts, but within the entire
fabric of the law. For example, since property often constitutes an
investment, its ownership involves such expectations as the hope of
increasing the value of the property by developing it. On the other
hand, every investment involves risks. Thus, owners should contem-
plate that governmental action, changes within the community, or
a variety of other factors can result in a decline in property values.
But when governmental action either fails to recognize the con-
templated risks and expectations of the individual property owner,
or exceeds those contemplated risks, then this action breaches the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every
contract. Conversely, when the property owner contemplated, or
should have contemplated, the risk/expectation of governmental ac-
tion, such action does not breach the implied covenant.
respect to goods of that kind." Id.
Whether the term is applied broadly or narrowly, the government falls squarely
within the merchant definition (of course, only if the U.C.C. applied to land sale
contracts-which it does not). Through its various state, county and municipal
agencies the government holds itself out as having knowledge as to these particular
goods (real property) and to the practices involved in these transactions (regulations
concerning real property).
See U.C.C. §§ 2-103(l)(b), 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207, 2-209, 2-314, 2-327(l)(c), 2-
402(2), 2-403(2), 2-509, 2-603, 2-605, 2-609 (1978), for provisions specifically ap-
plicable to merchants.
235. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
236. Justice Daniel included these elements in his contractual analysis: "[Bloth
the parties thereto are bound in good faith to fulfil it." West River Bridge, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532 (1848) (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court touched on this risk/expectation concept in
Penn Central:
Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt, ... Causby, Griggs,
and Hadacheck, the New York City law does not interfere in any
way with the present uses of the [tierminal. Its designation as a
landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may
continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the
past [sixty-five] years; as a railroad terminal . . . . So the law does
not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary
expectation concerning the use of the parcel.237
Of course, when the government recognizes the risks and expectations
contemplated by the property owner, but proceeds to regulate in
disregard of them, then the government has acted in bad faith. For
example, in Sheerr v. Evesham Township,23 the New Jersey Superior
Court cited numerous occasions on which counsel warned township
officials that their restrictive zoning of Sheerr's property was probably
unconstitutional. Despite these repeated warnings, the council con-
tinued to restrict Sheerr's property to an environmental protection
zone. This restriction constituted a clear breach of good faith and
fair dealing on the council's part, especially since several members
admitted in depositions that their intent was to acquire the property
for public use without paying for it-despite advice of counsel. 219
Another significant area of expectation is the concept of free
alienability. Each and every property owner expects to be able to
sell his or her property. When governmental action creates a situation
in which a sale is virtually impossible, the action goes beyond the
risk/expectation formula of the contract approach. For example, in
the Plainfield2 40 and Rippley241 cases, the zoning ordinances limiting
use to school purposes and public use purposes respectively resulted
in takings. Both courts considered the fact that the plaintiffs were
left in such a position that the zoning entity was the only possible
purchaser for their property, and, therefore, could name its own
price.2 42 Such action negates the owners' reasonable expectation of
alienability and clearly exceeds their risks.
237. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (1978) (emphasis added).
238. 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (L. Div. 1982); see supra notes 133-35
and accompanying text.
239. Sheerr, 184 N.J. Super. at 21, 445 A.2d at 51.
240. 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (L. Div. 1961). See supra notes 63, 131-
32 and accompanying text.
241. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983). See supra notes
64, 115-16 and accompanying text.
242. See Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785,
787 (L. Div. 1961); Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 508.
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In Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale,143 the ordinance at issue placed
Corrigan's property in a Conservation Area in which no development
was allowed. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that "[als long as
the property was 'zoned' in the Conservation Area, there was no
reasonable hope that anyone would purchase the property ....
Again, this exceeds contemplated risks and, under the contract ap-
proach, constitutes a taking.
More difficult to analyze is the expectation of fitness for an
intended purpose. In commercial law, when the sellers are aware of
that purpose, they impliedly warrant that the product will be suitable,
assuming the buyer has relied on the expertise of the seller in selecting
the most suitable product for the buyer's purpose. Similarly, in light
of the implied contract between the government and property owners,
the government can be considered to be a party to every property
transaction. Thus, a property owner who makes known his intended
use of the property, and who relies on governmental assurances
thereto, should be entitled to the same warranty, particularly if those
assurances are active rather than passive.
In the area of land use and development law, this idea takes the
form of development agreements. What is a development agreement,
after all, but a contract negotiated between the property owner and
the government? In the agreement, each side states its expectations
and enumerates the risks it is accepting in order to attain those
expectations. The concept of fitness for an intended purpose enters
the agreement when the developer and the governmental agency
specify the type of development permitted, and the type(s) of permits
to be issued. For example, if the agreement states that the property
is to be rezoned for multi-family housing in exchange for the de-
velopers' dedications of open space, the agency is warranting that
the rezoning will be given, provided the developers keep their end
of the bargain.
The concept of developers' vested rights is another example of
the contract theory in practice. Some states now provide for vested
tentative maps. 245 Similarly, case law has established the concept of
243. 149 Ariz. 538, 720 P.2d 513 (1986); see supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
244 Id. at 544 n.3, 720 P.2d at 519 n.3.
245. For a slightly higher filing fee, these maps guarantee certain privileges to
the landowner to continue development under whatever land use restrictions existed
at the time of vesting, regardless of subsequent rezonings. The fee in exchange for
the guarantee supplies the necessary contractual consideration.
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vesting once actual development has begun. 24 6 At a certain point,
the developer is deemed to have expended such time, effort and
money on his project that it would be inequitable to force him to
conform to subsequent changes in land use restrictions upon his
property. Again, this kind of relianCe is analogous to the reliance
upon an implied warranty of fitness for an intended purpose. Having
issued the permits that enable the developer to reach this stage of
construction, the governmental agency certainly knoWs the proposed
use of the property. Thus, having that knowledge and having ap-
proved the project up to this point, the agency is estopped from
disclaiming the warranty that the project Will be allowed to proceed
to completion.
246. See Tankersley Bros. Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 227 Ark. 130, 296
S.W.2d 412 (1956) (cityestopped from requiring demolition of building built under
building permit buit in violation of zoning ordinances); Aries Dev. Co. v. California
Coastal Zone Conservati6 Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1976) (developer's right not vested despite issuance of grading permit and com-
mencement of grading of site because, building permit not issued before enactment
of Coastal Act), cerit. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Anderson v. City Council, 229
Cal. AIp. 2d 79; 40 Cal. Rptr. 4i (1964) (puirchas of property and expenditure
of funds before application fori building permit does not give owner vested right
as-against future changes iii applicable zoning laws); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co.
v. City of Hollywood; 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976) (owner's rights had vested in
coitinuation of current zoning because of good faith reliance on building permit
and substantial expenditures, although construction had not commenced); Schulman
v. Fulton County, 249 Ga. 852, 295 S.E.2d 102 (1982) (owner acquired vested right
in special use permit by constructing lighting system in accordance with modifications
required by guch permit, and issuing entity cannot reconsider its decision or revoke
permit); Osina v. City of Chicago, 28 111. App. 3d 955, 329 N.E.2d 498 (1975)
(nursing home owner had vested right in continuing same use despite change in
zoning, and despite having made no substantial change in position or expenditure
of funds in reliance on previous zoning); Pailet v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.
2d 1091 (La. 1983) (owners' acquiring renovation permit for questionable noncon-
forming use did not give them vested right to make renovations far beyond scope
of permit); Dingeman Advertising, Inc. v. Algoma Tp., 393 Mich. 89, 223 N.W.2d
689 (1974) (to determine substantiality of reliance, court should consider all work
done in reliance on building permit up to time owner is notified permit is being
revoked, not just to date zoning ordinance is changed); Ridgewood Dev. Co. v.
State, 294 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1980) (no vested right can be acquired in privilege
granted by statute, such as availability of tax-free municipal bonds to finance private
housing project); Henry & Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 120 N.H. 910,
424 A.2d 1132 (1980) (developer's right to complete entire project, as planned and
70076 constructed, vested and was unaffected by change in minimum lot size or-
dinance); Turner v. Martz, 42 Pa. 328, 401 A.2d 585 (1979) (owners acquired
vested right in erroneously issued municipal sewer permit because they had no
means by which to determine that permit was improperly issued, they obtained
permit and used it in good faith, and they made large financial investment in
reliance on validity of permit).
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In summary, the risks and expectations of the property owner
include: (1) the expectation of exclusive physical possession; (2) the
right to lawful use that does not constitute a nuisance; (3) the
expectation that both parties' actions under the contract will be
governed by the concepts of good faith and fair dealing; (4) the
right of free alienability; (5) the expectation of fitness for an intended
purpose if so warranted; and (6) the risk that changes in circumstances
or in governmental regulation will reduce the profitability or allow-
able uses of the property.
B. Applying the Contract Approach
To end sixty-five years of confusion in the area of regulatory
takings, courts should apply well-founded principles that permit a
high degree of predictability, yet maintain the flexibility so important
to land-use planning. The contract approach provides this balance
of flexibility and predictability. The remainder of this Article applies
contract theory to cases in three areas of land use regulation: (1)
dedication for public use; (2) rent control; and (3) growth man-
agement.
1. Dedication for Public Use
One of the most dramatic developments of the past two decades
has been the government's insistence that, in exchdnge for the nec-
essary official approvals, developers dedicate a portion of their
private property for open space and other traditionally government-
financed improvements, facilities and services. This requirement not
only adds cost to the project, but often adds such a degree of
uncertainty as to make the project either infeasible or unprofitable.
In Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n. ,247 for example, the
plaintiffs purchased their undeveloped beach-front lot in 1979 in a
private residential community between two public beaches. The beach
above the high tide line in front of plaintiffs' and their neighbors'
lots, however, was privately owned.2 48 When the Grupes applied for
a permit to build a large single-family home, they were told that,
under the provisions of the 1972 California Coastal Zone Conser-
vation Act, 249 the permit would issue only if they would irrevocably
247. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
248. Id. at 155, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
249. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (Deerings 1976). The California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act of 1972 was passed by initiative. See CAL. CONST. art. X,
§ 4. It was replaced by the California Coastal Act of 1976. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 30000-30900 (Deerings 1976 & 1987 Supp.).
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dedicate their beach area above the high tide line to the public.
This area comprised approximately two-thirds of their lot.2 ;5' The
California courts found a legitimate exercise of the police power in
the Act, which was enacted to prevent the destruction of California's
coastal areas through overdevelopment, and to guarantee maximum
public access to the beaches."'
The California Court of Appeal used several of the classic takings
tests to find that the dedication did not constitute a taking. Applying
the diminution in value test, the court found no evidence that the
dedication decreased the value of the plaintiffs' property. 52 Dis-
cussing reciprocity of advantage, the court found that the Grupes had
received the substantial benefit of being allowed to proceed with
the development of his property along the coast..2 5
3
Under the contract approach, what would the result have been?
One must first examine when Grupe formed his expectations. Ac-
companied by much public and media discussion, the Coastal Act
had been passed seven years prior to his purchase of the property.
Thus, Grupe should have been aware at the time of purchase that
his property was within the special coastal zone subject to the
provisions of the Act. The Coastal Commission had consistently
applied the Act's conditions to new coastal development. Based on
this usage, 54 Grupe's expectations and risks should not have changed
since buying the property. Second, one must ask what Grupe's risks
and expectations were. Grupe would undoubtedly emphasize his
expectation of exclusive physical possession, but given the consistent
application of the then-existing Coastal Act, he should not have
expected exclusive physical possession of his coastal property in the
event he requested a building permit. Grupe assumed the risk that
upon application for a permit, the Act would require him to give
up a portion of his exclusive possession.
Any viable argument Grupe could propose regarding his risks and
expectations as to exclusive possession would focus on the extent
to which that possession was invaded. Certainly, complete loss of
possession or loss of any reasonable beneficial use would go beyond
250. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
251. Id. at 160, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30210
(Deering 1976 & 1987 Supp.)).
252. Id. at 175, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
253. Id. at 176-77, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
254. According to customary contract language, "[a]n agreement is interpreted
in accordance with a relevant usage if each party knew or had reason to know
of the usage . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220 (1979). The Grupes
clearly had reason to know of this usage.
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the risks assumed by him, even in light of the Act. The facts indicate,
however, that despite the requirement that he dedicate two-thirds
of his lot, Grupe could still construct a home on the remainder of
that lot; thus, he did not lose all beneficial use.255
The contract approach to Grupe yields the same result as the
more traditional tests. A contract analysis, however, would have
given both parties a clearer idea of their rights and liabilities and
would have provided guidance to both the private property owners
affected by the Coastal Act and the governmental agencies admin-
istering the Act's provisions. In fact, such an approach might have
precluded a law suit altogether.
Similarly, in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n.,256 the Nollans
had to dedicate a public beach area in order to obtain a building
permit under the provisions of the Coastal Act. In certain respects,
however, Nollan differed from Grupe: the condition of public ded-
ication had been applied to most of the surrounding property; a
much smaller part of the property was involved; and the Nollans
had allowed the public to cross their beach area freely for many
years before they applied for the building permit.
Two questions must be asked: (1) when did the Nollans' risks
and expectations arise; and (2) what were they? The facts are not
clear as to when the Nollans acquired their option to purchase the
subject property. It is possible, however, that they had acquired the
option prior to the enactment of the Coastal Act. Thus, in contrast
to Grupe, the Nollans acquired the property interest at a time when
255. Also, the Act specifically mandates public access requirements for any new
development within the zone. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212(a) (Deering 1976 &
1987 Supp.). In Grupe's particular circumstances, the offer to dedicate was irrev-
ocable for 21 years, during which time the beach shall "not be . . . opened to
public use until a public agency or private association agrees to accept responsibility
for maintenance and liability of the accessway." Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at
160, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85 (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212(a) (Deering
1976 & 1987 Supp.)). Further, acceptance of the offer would only occur if similar
dedications could be procured from adjoining landowners, an event viewed as
unlikely by the court. "If the events do not occur within the prescribed 21-year
period, the condition will simply expire." Id. at 184, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
Therefore, the risk was reasonably foreseeable but not probable that he would be
required to create a public beach, and, thus, an expected incident of this contract.
In the Grupe case, the Regional Coastal Commission acknowledged that the pos-
sibility of its being able to acquire the surrounding beach for public use by the
imposition of similar uncompensated dedications was unlikely. But the remoteness
of the possibility did not relieve the Commission of its duty to make the effort
within the provisions of the Act.
256. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). See supra notes 199-219 and accompanying text.
The appellate court decision is at 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1986).
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they may not have initially contemplated the circumstance or usage,
i.e., the enactment of the Coastal Act.
Contractual risks and expectations, however, are perceived not
only when the relationship is formed but also throughout its per-
formance: "Where the contract ... involves repeated occasions for
performance ... with ... opportunity for objection to it by the
other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without
objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement."257
Even if a landowner can establish that he could not earlier perceive
such a risk or expectation, subsequent conduct that is inconsistent
with an earlier understanding may waive or modify the earlier un-
derstanding. 5 8
The Nollans applied for their permit in 1982. By that time, the
state court found, the Nollans' property was located "in an area
where numerous dedications for public access have been made on
nearly all the beach front parcels. ' ' 5 9 In addition to three more
years of public debate, numerous law suits had not succeeded in
prohibiting the application of the Coastal Act. Finally, the Nollans
had for some years permitted public access to the portion of the
property in question.
In light of the Nollans' course of performance which appeared
to accept or acquiesce in these factors, the Nollans could not deny
that the risk of this type of changed circumstances was contemplated.
Even if one cannot accept that the Nollans' course of performance
establishes their acceptance of the risk, it would be relevant in
establishing a waiver or modification of the terms of the original
implied contract.
As in Grupe, the risk or expectation in Nollan involved exclusive
possession. Moreover, as in Grupe, the loss of exclusive possession
in Nollan does not surpass the risks that the Nollans should have
contemplated in light of the circumstances and their course of per-
formance, specifically, their continuing failure to object to the publ-
ic's access to this property.
A different situation arose in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.160 The church had
257. U.C.C. § 2-208 (1978).
258. Id. § 2-208(3). "[Sluch course of performance shall be relevant to show a
waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course of performance."
Id.
259. Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 724, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (1986).
260. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). See supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
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owned the property and used it as a children's camp for twenty-
one years before the buildings were destroyed in a flood. Since the
threat of flooding continued, the county adopted an ordinance that
created an interim flood protection area where all construction was
prohibited. The camp was located in this-restricted area.
Ordinarily, a complete restriction on the use of the property would
clearly exceed the risks assumed by the property owner and result
in a compensable taking. Thus, on its face, the ordinance in First
English effected a taking of the church's property. Unlike the facts
in Grupe and Nollan, the church did not even enjoy the "reciprocity
of advantage" of receiving a building permit in exchange for the
loss of use of its property. But a closer analysis under the contract
approach results in a different interpretation. Again, one must ask
two questions: (1) when did the owners' risks and expectations arise;
and (2) what were they?
In this case, the church's risks and expectations arose in 1957,
when it bought the property. But the issue of what those risks and
expectations were poses some problems. The church's property was
described as within "the natural drainage channel for a watershed
area." ' 26' As a result, did the church have notice of the risk of
flooding when they bought the property? Assuming the church had
notice of such a risk, the county's ordinance may well have been
a foreseeable risk as well. The church could certainly expect that
the county would take the necessary safety measures to prevent loss
of life in an area of potential flooding-especially if the proposed
use of the property was as a camp for handicapped children.
Justice Stevens' dissent raised another troublesome point: what
did the church reasonably expect to be able to do with the property? 262
Knowing that there was a danger of future flooding, the church
could not reasonably expect to rebuild its camp in the same location.
In fact, the only imaginable uses for the property in such a condition
would be for agriculture or forestry, both of which would involve
no construction and, moreover, would contribute to the abatement
of the flooding danger. The flood control ordinance did not prohibit
these uses.
In summary, at the time it bought the property, the church should
have anticipated the risk that the property would become uninha-
bitable due to flooding. If flooding became a continuing danger,
261. Id. at 2381.
262. See supra note 197.
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the church should have known that the county would need to pass
a public safety ordinance such as the flood protection plan. Fur-
thermore, the church should not reasonably have expected that the
property would remain usable for even intermittent residential use.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, the church had not suggested any
other use to which it might have wanted to put the property. Thus,
until the church established with what expectation the county's or-
dinance had interfered, the contract approach would not require that
a taking be found and compensation awarded.
2. Rent Control
In a society with a rapidly increasing urban population, frequently
of limited economic means, housing becomes a critical problem. One
approach to the problem, which has had mixed results, is rent control.
Obviously, such regulations significantly reduce landlord incentives
and profits.
In Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan,263 the Supreme
Court dismissed without opinion the property owner's appeal of a
decision upholding the denial of permits that would have allowed
plaintiff to evict tenants from rent-controlled residential property
and to demolish the building. The shopping center acquired the six-
unit apartment building on adjoining land with the intent to demolish
the building and pave the property as an extension of its parking
lot.2 64 Between the time the center entered into the purchase contract
and the date the sale actually occurred, the city passed an ordinance
requiring a removal permit before any rental units could be eliminated
from the housing market. Although only one of the units was
occupied, the city denied the center's applications to evict that tenant
and tear down the building. 26 15
In applying a contract approach to this case, one must ask when
the center formed its expectations and what those expectations were.
Fresh Pond entered the agreement prior to the enactment of the
ordinance. Moreover, unlike the situation in Nollan, nothing in their
course of performance indicated that such a change in circumstances
was acquiesced in or contemplated.
The city's acts also violated both the good faith and the intended
purpose expectations, and arguably constituted a physical invasion.
263. 464 U.S. 875 (1983).
264. Id. at 875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Having earlier condemned a portion of the center's parking lot, the
city was aware that the center needed parking spaces to replace those
lost as a result of the condemnation. Nevertheless, knowing that
the center intended to demolish the building and replace the parking
spots lost by the condemnation, the city made no objection to the
center acquiring the adjoining apartment building. An integral par-
ticipant in this transaction, the city failed to make the shopping
center aware of its intent to deny the permit to demolish the building.
In so doing the city breached the implied warranty of fitness for
the intended purpose.
Dissenting from the dismissal, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the res-
trictions in the state and city regulations applicable to the property.
He observed that the shopping center could not evict the tenant.
Furthermore, even if the tenant voluntarily vacated, there was no
certainty that the board would allow the building to be demolished.
It was clear, however, that "until the tenant decides to leave of his
own volition, appellant is unable to possess the property. 266
Rehnquist also pointed out that the ordinance did not contain the
time limitation that enabled the Court to uphold a similar ordinance
in the wartime case of Block v. Hirsh.26' He concluded that " 'even
though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the
occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of
that space by a stranger would ordinarily empty the right of any
value . . ' ,,268. Such permanent occupation would result in the
owner losing the right to exclude others-" 'one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights .. ' ",269
266. Id. at 877 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist stated:
The combined effect of the limitations . . . is to deny appellant use of
his property .... [T]he Rent Control Board has determined that until
the remaining tenant decides to leave, appellant will be unable to vacate
and demolish the building. In my view this deprives appellant of the use
of its property in a manner closely analogous to a permanent physical
invasion .... [In Teleprompter w]e ... called a permanent physical
occupation of another's property "the most serious form of invasion of
an owner's property interest."
Id. at 876-77 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (citations
omitted)).
Rehnquist continued, "As the Cambridge ordinance operates in this case, I fail
to see how it works anything but a physical occupation of appellant's property."
Id. at 877.
267. Id. at 878 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135,
157 (1921)).
268. Id. at 878 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
269. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Rehnquist compared the owner's right to possession and, by ex-
-tension, his right to exclude others to the owner's right to freedom
from physical invasion. This strong argument, if accepted by the
remainder of the Court, would have produced a -contrary result. But
the Court has rarely treated the right to exclude with the same
sanctity as the loss of physical possession. Thus, Justice Rehnquist
might have had more success in -convincing the majority if he had
employed a -contract theory argument.
The inability to close one's business is normally not a risk con-
templated in purchasing real property. Therefore, assuming that the
ordinance was not reasonably foreseeable by the center at the time
it entered into 'the contract, and assuming that changed circumstances
together with 'an inconsistent course of performance did not establish
its ,foreseeabi'lity, the governmental regulation would then violate the
contract approach and require just -compensation.
If the 'enactment of the regulation and its resulting limitations on
the future property uses were reasonably foreseeable at the time 'the
individual purchased the property, and both parties had acted in
,good faith, the ,contract approach would not compensate the owner
'for the alleged taking since the owner chose to gamble by purchasing
'the property despite the anticipated regulatory change. Thus, as-
suming no bad 'faith 'on the part of the government, the majority's
dismissal would 'be compatible with the contract approach.
In a California case, Nash v. City of Santa Monica,2 1 the majority
tof he court ;applied a number 'of ,contract theory concepts in bal-
;ancing the 'parties' expectations and the 'burdens imposed on them
'by the 'subject 'ordinance. As 'in Fresh Pond Shopping Center, this
'ordinance prohibited ,the removal 'of rental units from the housing
market 'by 'conversion or 'demolition without a -removal permit from
the 6ity..271 'On these facts alone,, denying 'a 'person :the right to
demolish 'the building -and retain 'the vacant land 'would be so sub-
270. 37 'Cal. 3d '97, '688 'P.2d :894, .207 'Cal. R'ptr. 285 (1984).
27.1. Id. at 99, 688 'P.2d 'at 898-99, 207 'Cal. Rptr.. ;at 288-90. The court introduced
'its opinion with t'he 'f6llowing :statement::
As is so often ,the case in constitutional litigation, the issues appear
different :depending upon 'one's 'perspective. For Santa Monica, the ichal-
lenged provision is nothing more 'than a land use regulation designed to
effectuate ithe ipurposes 'o'f the city's -rent control 'ordinance of which it
'is a :part, while Nash iews it as ta imeans of 'forcing bim 'to :remain a
'landlord despite 'his wish 'to "'go ;out 'of 'business"-an interest which he
asserts is among ithe "'basic values 'implicit in the concept of ,ordered
!liberty'.... " There 'is a ,degree of -merit in 'both perspectives, 'but neither
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stantial a violation of the risks and expectations normally associated
with the purchase, ownership and sale of real property as to constitute
a taking under the contract approach. A number of additional facts,
however, supported the majority's conclusion that no taking had
occurred.
First, Nash's mother had purchased the apartment building for
him. One year later, Santa Monica passed its ordinance because the
city was facing a severe shortage of rental property, especially for
persons in low and moderate income brackets. Under the provisions
of the law:
Where the landlord both owns habitable property and, does not
wish, to rebuild, a demolition permit will be granted only upon
a finding that: (1) the building is not occupied by persons of low
or moderate income; (2) cannot be afforded by persons of low
or moderate income; (3) removal will not adversely affect the
housing supply; and (4) the owner cannot make a reasonable
return on his investment. 21 2
Second, Nash conceded that he was earning a fair return, on his
investment from the rents being paid by his tenants, and that de-
molishing the building would have an adverse effect on the, housing
supply.2 73 But he told the court:. "There is only one thing f want
to do, and that is to evict the group of ingrates inhabiting my units,
tear down the building, and hold on to the land until'I can sell it
at a price which will not mean a ruinous loss on my investment. ' 27 4
is adequate to resolve the issue presented. Rather, . . . what is required
is a realistic appraisal of the impact of the challenged provision upon
Nash and the alternatives available to him, on the one hand, and' of
the relationship of that provision to the objectives of the rent control
ordinance, on the other.
Id. at 99-100, 688 P.2d at 896, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (citations omitted).
272. Id. at 101, 688 P.2d at 897, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (quoting Santa Monica
City Charter art. XVIII, § 1803, subd.. (t)).
273. Id. at 101-02, 688 P.2d at 897, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
274. Id. Nash based his principal argument against the application of the ordinance
on the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits
involuntary servitude. The court did not find this argument persuasive, stating; that
"Nash remains free to minimize his personal involvement . .. " in the duties
necessary to a landlord. Id'. at 103, 688 P.2d at 898, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 289. In
light of the state's police power to regulate to protect the public health, safety
and welfare, the, court found that Nash had no absolute right to demolish the
building and retain the land as an investment. Therefore, Nash had not been.
unconstitutionally deprived' of his property because, the ordinance in question clearly
was a permissible regulation under the tenth amendment's police power. Thus, the
Court reversed the judgment below. Id. at 109, 688 P.2d at 903, 207 Cal. Rptr.
at 294.
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Since persons of low and moderate income occupied the building,
the court found that he was not qualified to receive a demolition
permit.27
The contract approach results in the same conclusion. At the time
Nash's mother bought the property in 1978, public concern was
already being actively voiced over the rental housing shortage in
Santa Monica. It certainly is not improbable that Mrs. Nash pur-
chased the property with the hope of being able to convert it to
condominiums and thereby increase the potential profits from her
investment.27 6 But in view of the housing emergency that existed and
of the growing public and governmental concern, the possibility of
the rent control initiative and resulting regulations on rental properties
must have been reasonably foreseeable to the average prudent prop-
erty investor at the time Mrs. Nash acquired the building. - '
Upon attaining majority, Nash took title to the property from his
mother, and because she had bought it on his behalf, he retained
the risks and expectations attendant to ownership of this building
that existed at the time she purchased it. As the court pointed out,
Nash continued to draw a reasonable return from his property as
an investment, and also retained the right to dispose of the property.
Unlike cases where the only possible purchaser for the property was
the governmental agency imposing the restrictions on the property,
here there is no indication that the property was unsaleable because
of the ordinance.
Under the contract approach, the majority's opinion can also be
supported by questioning the good faith of the Nashes. In light of
a long-standing Santa Monica rent-control ordinance, Nash's stated
intent278 indicated that he was not acting in good faith. Such lack
of good faith would prevent him from prevailing. Just as the Court
questioned the good faith of the government in Fresh Pond Shopping
Center, it should do no less with the individual.
275. Id. at 102-03, 688 P.2d at 897, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89. In his dissent,
Justice Mosk argued that requiring one to remain a landlord is not a foreseeable
risk. " 'A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business
if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be
entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal
judicial precedent ........ Id. at I11, 688 P.2d at 904, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 295
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Harlan's unanimous opinion in Textile
Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263, 270 (1965)).
276. The facts in the case were silent on the question of whether Mrs. Nash
intended to convert the property into condominiums at the time she bought it.
277. See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 101, 688 P.2d at 896, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
278. Id. at 101, 688 P.2d at 897, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
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It appears that Mrs. Nash, and by implication her son, gambled
in a highly volatile market and lost. Since the risks were foreseeable,
and the regulations did not deprive Nash of all his reasonable
expectations concerning the property, no compensable taking of his
property occurred.
Hall v. City of Santa Barbara179 dealt with a rent-control ordinance
which gave tenants the right to "leases of unlimited duration." 280
Applied to mobile home parks, the ordinance required that park
space leases be terminable at will by the tenants, but only for cause
by the park operator., Unlike apartments, mobile homes are usually
sold by the tenants, and the buyers then succeed the sellers as tenants
of the mobile home park. 8 2
The Halls owned and operated a mobile home park. They chal-
lenged the ordinance as effecting a taking of their property. Their
claim was novel-they argued that "by giving tenants the right to
a perpetual lease at a below-market rental rate, the ordinance trans-
ferred to each of them a possessory interest in the land on which
their mobile home is located." 2 ' This interest, the Halls argued,
had a market value and was transferrable by the tenants without
any right of control remaining in the park owner. 284
In finding that the district court had abused its discretion by
dismissing the complaint rather than giving the Halls an opportunity
to amend,'285 the court noted that motions to dismiss inverse con-
demnation complaints must be reviewed with particular skepticism
since "the Supreme Court itself has admitted its inability to develop
any 'set formula' for determining when compensation should be
paid, . . resorting instead to 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries'
to resolve this difficult question. ' ' 286
In analyzing the case, the court found that "certain features of
the Santa Barbara ordinance, . . . make it peculiarly susceptible to
the claim presented by the Halls. 28 7 The tenants were in a position
to determine who their successors to the leasehold estate would be,
and the landlord probably couldn't even go out of business in order
279. 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986).
280. Id. at 1273.
281. Id. at 1273-74.
282. Id. at 1273.
283. Id. at 1273-74.
284. Id. at 1274.
285. Id. at 1274 n.6.
286. Id. at 1274 (citation omitted).
287. Id. at 1276.
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to recover control of his property. 28 8 The court concluded that "it
would be difficult to say that the ordinance does not transfer an
interest in [the Halls'] land to others. '289
The contract approach yields the same conclusion. That is, it
would surely be beyond the reasonable expectations of a property
owner that the government would vest a greater property interest
in his tenants than in the owner of the underlying fee.
3. Growth Management
Land is one of the most precious and limited natural resources.
As a growing population shifts to areas of the country considered
most desirable,. land's value becomes even more apparent. Land use
planning addresses the important conundrum of how society deals
with this resource and the strains placed upon it.
Ramapo, New York, is a town within commuting distance of New
York City.2 9° "Experiencing the pressures of an increase in population
and the ancillary problem of providing municipal facilities and serv-
ices," 2 9 the town adopted amendments to its comprehensive zoning
ordinance "for the alleged purpose of eliminating premature sub-
division and urban sprawl. ' 292 In order to obtain building permits
for residential development, developers first had to obtain a special
permit which was contingent upon the availability of five essential
facilities or services specified under the statute. If the developer
wanted to speed up the process, and not wait for the city to put
the services and facilities in place, the developer could obtain the
special permit by putting in the facilities at his own expense.
288. Id. at 1279 n.18. In a footnote, the court made the following observation:
State and local laws seem to pose considerable obstacles to going out
of the mobile park business. State law allows the mobile park owner to
evict tenants in order to put the park to a different use only upon six
months' notice; such notice may only be given after all necessary local
permits have been obtained .... Santa Barbara in turn requires that a
mobile home park owner obtain a permit to convert a park to another
use .... An applicant for such a permit must file a plan outlining the
use to which the property is to be put, describing the impact of the
removal on displaced residents, and disclosing the relocation assistance
to be provided.
Id. (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 1227.
290. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
291. Id. at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
292. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (footnote omitted).
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The court found that "[w]ithout a doubt restrictions upon the
property in the present case are substantial in nature and duration,
especially in light of the fact that they threaten to burden individual
parcels for as long as a full generation."2 93 Nevertheless, the city's
ordinance was upheld.
An analysis under the "when" prong of the contract approach
shows that the developers in Ramapo all purchased property prior
to the enactment of the ordinance. The question, however, is whether
the developers contemplated or should have contemplated significant
restrictions on their freedom to develop the property as a result of
the town's need to manage growth. Certainly, by the mid to late
1960's, in an area within commuting distance to New York City,
growth management must have been a familiar concept and thus a
recognizable risk, especially to developers who-like merchants in
commercial contracts294-should have had a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the relationship between the property owner and the
government.
The more vital question focuses on the extent of this contemplated
risk. The court in Ramapo acknowledged that a permanent restriction
on all reasonable use of the property must be recognized as a taking.
In contrast, a temporary restriction that would allow profitable use
within a reasonable time would not result in a taking unless "the
measure is either unreasonable in terms of necessity or the [resulting]
293. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
294. See supra note 237 for the U.C.C. definition of merchant. Except for the
obvious fact that the U.C.C. and the term "merchant" deal with "goods" rather
than real property, the above definition of merchant could easily apply to a
developer-one who in the field of real property has knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker. The government, particularly
as to the various agencies that deal with real property planning and development,
is no less a "merchant" in the field.
The official comment to U.C.C. § 2-104 describes a "merchant" as a professional
and "assumes that transactions between professionals in a given field require special
and clear rules which may not apply to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer."
U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 1 (1977).
It can be said that professionalism, special knowledge and common experience
are to be used in determining whether a person in a particular situation is to be
deemed a "merchant." Decatur Cooperative Ass'n v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547
P.2d 323 (1976). Further, a person who holds himself out as having knowledge
,or skill involved in the transaction will be considered a merchant as defined by
U.C.C. § 2-104 whether he actually has such knowledge or skill. William Aupperle
& Sons, Inc. v. American Indem. Co., 75 111. App. 3d 722, 394 N.E.2d 725 (1979).
Even familiarity with trade practices has been sufficient to confer merchant status
on a contractor. Pecker Iron Works, Inc. v. Sturdy Concrete Co., 96 Misc. 2d
998, 410 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1978).
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diminution in value is such as to be tantamount to a confiscation."'2
The court's approach, however, only answers part of the question.
Unlike a permanent restriction on all reasonable use, a so-called
temporary restriction does not always escape being deemed a taking-
particularly when the restriction lasts as long as eighteen years, as
it did in Ramapo. Thus, the better approach would be to ask whether
such a temporary limitation was reasonably foreseeable or within
the contemplation of the parties when they formed their risks and
expectations.
In light of Ramapo, a growing number of ordinances imposing
similar restrictions, and a national interest in growth management,
community developers should currently contemplate such a risk.
Decided in 1972, Ramapo reflected a new direction in growth man-
agement: a temporary but nonetheless lengthy moratorium on the
development of property. Up to the time of this decision, however,
this risk was not within the contemplation of the developers. Thus,
enforcement of the regulations constituted a taking, pursuant to the
contract approach.
Further, the ordinance in Ramapo permitted the developer to speed
up the approval process by installing some or all of the needed
facilities and services himself. 296 This was another novel concept in
1972 and thus not foreseeable at that time. Since Ramapo, requiring
developers to provide essential services and facilities before building
permits will issue has become the norm. Therefore, developers today
would be expected to anticipate this cost when planning their projects.
Since it is now foreseeable, post-Ramapo cases would not result in
a taking under the contract approach. 297
295. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 381, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153 (citation
omitted).
296. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
The contract approach involves not only contemplated risks but also traditional
expectations including the requirement of good faith. The Ramapo court briefly
addressed this requirement as well:
[T]he [tiown will put its best effort forward in implementing the physical
and fiscal timetable outlined under the plan. Should subsequent events
prove this assumption unwarranted, or should the [t]own because of some
unforeseen event fail in its primary obligation to these landowners, there
will be ample opportunity to undo the restrictions upon default. ...
Prognostication on our part in upholding the ordinance proceeds upon
the presently permissible inference that within a reasonable time the
subject property will be put to the desired use at an appreciated value.
Id. (emphasis added).
297. Although requiring developers to install public facilities and services may
now be foreseeable, whether this exceeds the scope of the police power is another
question too complex to be addressed here.
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Livermore, California, a suburb of San Francisco, was the subject
of a voter initiative prohibiting the "issuance of further residential
building permits until local educational, sewage disposal, and water
supply facilities compl[ied] with specified standards."'' 9" The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court described the case of Associated Home Builders,
Inc. v. City of Livermore as "symboliling] the growing conflict
between the efforts of suburban communities to check disorderly
development, with its concomitant problems of air and water pol-
lution and inadequate public facilities, and the increasing public need
for adequate housing opportunities."2 99
The California court found that local growth management was a
valid exercise of the police power, provided that its purpose did not
conflict with an overall regional scheme. The majority, however,
failed adequately to address the fifth amendment takings problem.
As Justice Mosk pointed out in his dissenting opinion, that ordinance
provided no timetable or dates by which the public services were
to be made adequate. Thus, the moratorium on permits was likely
to continue for decades, or at least until attrition ultimately reduced
the present population.3'0
In Livermore, the risk to the developer was no development at
all for the foreseeable future with no means of speeding up the
development approval process. A complete moratorium of unlimited
duration on building permits is not a reasonably contemplated risk.
Thus, under the contract approach, the Livermore ordinance would
be unforeseeable because of its unlimited duration, and this, com-
bined with the lack of good faith and fair dealing on the part of
the city in not providing either flexibility or a specific timetable,
would constitute a breach of the implied contract. 0 '
298. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 588,
557 P.2d 473, 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1976).
299. Id. at 589, 557 P.2d at 475-76, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44.
300. Id. at 617, 557 P.2d at 493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
[T]he ordinance prohibited the issuance of building permits for residential
purposes until certain conditions are met, but the measure does not
provide that any person or agency is required to expend or commence
any efforts on behalf of the city to meet the requirements. Nor is the
city itself obliged to act within any specified time to cure its own
deficiencies. Thus, in these circumstances procrastination produces its
own reward: continued exclusion of new residents.
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
301. What if the enacting city is "an isolated, substantially rural area, ... which
wants to preserve its character or at least guard against unforeseen, adverse con-
sequences of too rapid development"? Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 380 Mass.
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VI. Conclusion
After sixty-five years of confusion, it is time for a more clearly
defined and more easily applied approach to the regulatory takings
problem. The 1987 decisions of the Supreme Court merely continue
the confusion-they do not resolve it.
At the same time, the need to resolve this increasingly complex
issue is critical. Developers must be able to calculate their risks with
a reasonable degree of certainty. If not, they will look elsewhere to
invest their resources. In some areas of the country, developers are
already seeking alternative investments because the uncertainties of
246, 254, 402 N.E.2d 1346, 1351 (1980).
Chilmark is a Martha's Vineyard community "with a permanent residential
population of approximately 400 people, . . . an area of 10,500 acres, and only
five paved public ways." Id. at 260, 402 N.E.2d at 1354. It adopted a "rate of
development" amendment to its zoning by-laws that restricted issuance of building
permits to one-tenth of the lots in each subdivision each year for ten years. The
court pointed out the differences between this case and a situation such as existed
in Ramapo:
Although the difference between suburban and rural development may
be only a matter of degree and the basic constitutional principles are
the same, the considerations, and the weight to be given to various
factors, may differ. Regional needs, which are often important consid-
erations ... may differ between suburban and rural areas, and the
exclusionary impact of the municipality's action may be significantly
reduced. Thus, in a rural . . . setting .... the public interest in preserving
the environment and protecting a way of life may outweigh whatever
undesirable economic and social consequences inhere in partly "closing
the doors" to affluent outsiders primarily seeking vacation homes.
Id. at 254-55, 402 N.E.2d at 1351-52.
The court found that "public interest in the preservation of the qualities of
Martha's Vineyard . . ." had been expressed by the "creation of a statutory
commission to assist in that preservation .... ." Id. at 256, 402 N.E.2d at 1352.
Further, the town itself had expressed the desire to have an opportunity to explore
"whether it had a problem."
The need for time for study provides a rational reason for the by-law's
sequential restrictions, at least during the years immediately following its
adoption .... We address a partial and annually relaxing restriction on
the construction of what will for the most part be second, or vacation,
homes.
Id. at 259-60, 402 N.E.2d at 1354 (footnote omitted).
And, as in Ramapo, the court implied a duty of good faith on the town's part:
We assume, in the absence of a contrary showing, that a period of ten
years is reasonably necessary to complete all necessary studies and to
implement recommendations and that the town will proceed with its
studies in good faith. . . . A very different case would be presented if
it were determined that the town was not proceeding with the necessary
studies which are said to be the basis for the enactment of the rate of
development by-law.
Id. at 259 n.16, 402 N.E.2d at 1354 n.16.
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the various regulations have left them unable to calculate the risks.
The development industry should not have to shoulder the burden
of correcting the various ills of society, including environmental
deterioration, inner city decay and shrinking natural resources. Unless
government develops equitable guidelines for land use planning, this
industry could, like the rail and steel industries of a generation ago,
become unprofitable and require significant government support.
The contract approach suggests a dramatic yet not radical new
direction. Contractual principles are familiar to and more easily
understood by individuals, development companies and governmental
agencies. Contractual principles provide a proven method of flexi-
bility that the variety of currently used takings tests cannot provide.
Most importantly, contractual principles provide a body of existing
theories against which both the government and the private property
owner can measure risks and expectations. Why try to fix a broken
and poorly made wheel when a sturdy and serviceable one is readily
available?
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